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1I. INTRODUCTION  
 
1. There are two reasons why a lawyer from a civil law country is puzzled when he is confronted 
with an antisuit injunction: It is a concept which is unfamiliar to him, like the system of equity 
jurisprudence, in which it is embedded, and a concept he feels uncomfortable with. The latter is linked 
to the first and results from the fact that it is contrary to his understanding that a court actively enjoins a 
party from proceeding in court. In particular, when it comes to enjoining a party from concurrently 
proceeding in the courts of another sovereign. In such a posture, he rather expects the domestic court 
to question its own jurisdiction based on the principle of lis pendens or to refuse to enforce the foreign 
judgment if it finds that the foreign court did not have proper jurisdiction. 
2. This paper intends to examine the peculiarities of antisuit injunctions and to assess in which 
circumstances they should be issued - in particular in cases where there are concurrent litigations or 
arbitrations in different fora. In the part following this introduction, the pieces of the puzzle will be laid 
out, i.e. the purpose and the development of the antisuit-injunction concept will be described. This is to 
give an introductory overview of this legal tool, and further to be able to make use of the background so 
established when analyzing specific issues related to antisuit injunctions (Part II). Then, the way antisuit 
injunctions which enjoin a party from litigating in the courts of a foreign sovereign are issued by federal 
courts1 will be assessed (Part III) and an approach on how a court should respond to a request to 
enjoin a foreign litigation will be presented (Part IV). Finally, in Part V, it will be analyzed to what extent 
antisuit injunctions should be issued in the context of international arbitration proceedings, in particular 
whether international arbitrations that are concurrent to a domestic litigation, or foreign litigations that 
are concurrent to an international arbitration may be enjoined. 
 
1 Because the focus of this paper is with international cases, the issue of international antisuit injunctions 
will be addressed under federal jurisprudence because cases litigated or arbitrated abroad will often 
involve American and foreign parties, so that antisuit injunctions are in such a posture often issued by 
federal courts based on diversity jurisdiction. 
2II. PIECES OF THE PUZZLE 
 
A. Antisuit Injunctions as a Sub-Category of Injunctive Relief 
 
a) Antisuit Injunctions 
 
aa) Definition 
 
3. Antisuit injunctions are injunctions by a court that order a party not to commence or continue a 
suit in this or another court.2 The authority of federal courts to enjoin foreign proceedings is founded on 
their authority to restrain persons over which they have personal jurisdiction,3, 4 and against whom an 
antisuit injunction can consequently be enforced,5 from doing acts contrary to equity.6 An analysis of the 
pertinent case law shows that antisuit injunctions are issued for the following reasons:  
(i) To enjoin litigants with records of frivolous litigation from future litigations concerning a 
particular matter in question;7
(ii) To enjoin litigants from attempts to re-litigate an issue that has become res iudicata;8
2 cf. Hartley, p. 487; Philipps, p. 2009. 
3 cf. Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems, 369 F.3d 645, 652; Computer Associates International, Inc. v. 
Altai, Inc. 126 F.3d 365, 371; Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corporation, 76 F.3d 624, 626; Gau Shan v. Bankers 
Trust, 956 F.2d 1349, 1352; Asset Allocation and Management Company v. Western Employers 
Insurance Company, 892 F.2d 566, 569; China Trade v. M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33, 35; Laker Airways v. 
Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 926; Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Company of North 
America, 651 F.2d 877, 880; in re Laitasalo, 196 B.R. 913, 920; Chavier, p. 261.  
4 Personal jurisdiction over a person not physically present in the forum requires that the party has certain 
minimum contacts with the forum (cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316), like doing 
business in the forum (comp. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 933). Also in proceedings in rem or 
quasi in rem, these minimum contacts must be present (cf. Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212). 
5 cf. Ambrose, p. 404. 
6 cf. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Halchak, 71 F.Supp 224, 226-227. 
7 Courts have the power and obligation to protect public and efficient administration of justice from 
individuals who have a history of frivolous litigation entailing vexation, harassment and needless expense 
to other parties and unnecessary burden on courts and their supporting personnel (Whitaker v. San 
Francisco County, Superior Court of California, 514 U.S. 208, 210; Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121, 123; 
Howard v. Mail-Well Envelope Co., 150 F.3d 1227; Cauthon v. Rogers, 116 F.3d 1334; In re Winslow, 17 
F.3d 314; Olson v. Coleman, 997 F.2d 726; Ketchum v. Cruz, 961 F.2d 916; Moy v. U.S., 906 F.2d 467; 
Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069; Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497). 
8 cf. in re SDDS, Inc., 97 F.3d 1030; 56 F.3d 866; Thompson v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 992 F.2d 187; in re 
G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467; Charlton v. Estate of Charlton, 841 F.2d 988; American Jurisprudence 2d, 
Injunctions § 190. 
3(iii) To enjoin a particular parallel proceeding;9
(iv) To enjoin a party from enforcing an award.10
4. As already mentioned in the para. 2 hereinabove, the present paper puts the stress on the third 
posture in international settings. It will be examined when it is appropriate for a forum to enjoin the 
parties from proceeding with an action pending in a foreign forum when the parties are concurrently 
engaged in a litigation before the domestic court.  
 
bb) Effects of Antisuit Injunctions 
 
5. Antisuit injunctions fix the forum in an enforceable way; they are, therefore, first and foremost 
jurisdictional issues.11 Nonetheless, their jurisdictional relevance makes them, at least indirectly, also 
important for the substance of the litigation; for the determination of the forum (i) entails which conflict-
of-law rules, and thus which law, is applied and, by doing so, (ii) defines the result of the litigation; in 
another forum, the result might be different.12 
6. Antisuit injunctions cannot in all cases exclude that the enjoined party proceeds in the forbidden 
forum or in a third forum:13 If the antisuit injunction is neither recognizable in the foreign forum nor 
enforceable e.g. by contempt-of-court measures. Also, if the injunction is simply issued too late, the 
enjoined party will (i) usually not abide by the injunction if it deems the foreign forum to be more 
promising for its case and (ii) might, if the foreign forum also issues antisuit injunctions, apply for a 
counter-antisuit injunction enjoining the other party from pursuing its action in the domestic court.14 If 
this request is granted, a "battle" between the different fora may be the consequence, each forum 
 
9 If a matter in dispute is brought before different federal courts, the court which first obtains jurisdiction of 
parties and issues may preserve its jurisdiction by enjoining proceedings involving the same issues and 
parties that were begun thereafter in another federal court (cf. Small v. Wagemann, 291 F.2d 734, 735-
736; Victor Company, L.L.C., v. Ortho Organizers, Inc., 932 F.Supp. 261, 263; American Horse Protection 
Association v. Lying, 690 F.Supp 40, 42). 
10 cf. Philp v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945, 946. 
11 cf. Ambrose, p. 401 and 408. 
12 cf. Philipps, p. 2010. 
13 comp. Laker Airways Limited v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines et al., 731 F.2d 909. 
14 cf. James v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company, 14 Ill.2d 356, 371-372. 
4blocking access to the other.15 So, if all fora that are involved issue antisuit injunctions, this may lead to 
a deadlock of litigation.16, 17 An antisuit injunction is therefore only effective if the forum, from which a 
party shall be enjoined, does not have a corresponding concept or if an application to the foreign forum 
for a counter-antisuit injunction can actually be precluded by the antisuit injunction. 
 
cc) Development of the Antisuit-Injunction Tool 
 
7. The antisuit injunction tool was developed in England. In a first step, antisuit injunctions were 
issued by the common law courts to prevent the expansive jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts;18 in a 
second step, the remedy was used by the Court of Chancery to enjoin parties from bringing suits in the 
common law courts where this was "considered to be against good conscience".19 So, antisuit 
injunctions were first used as a tool against another type of courts within the same jurisdiction. Then, 
the scope of application was first extended to Scotland, Ireland and the British colonies, and then to the 
rest of the world.20, 21 
15 cf. Hartley, p. 488-489. Such a battle may even take place within the United States (comp. National 
Basketball Association v. Minnesota Professional Basketball, Ltd. Partnership, 56 F.3d 866, 870). 
16 cf. Gau Shan v. Bankers Trust, 956 F.2d 1349, 1354-1355; Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 927; 
Lenenbach, p. 265; Najarian, p. 974; Swanson, p. 32; American Jurisprudence 2d, Injunctions § 195. 
17 In sister-court cases, courts usually ignore an antisuit injunction that was issued by another state and do 
not consider these injunctions to require recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (cf. Philipps, p. 
2016 and 2019). On an international level, antisuit injunctions by a foreign forum are not entitled to 
recognition as a matter of right (cf. Kerwin, p. 931).  
18 cf. Bermann, p. 593. 
19 cf. Hartley, p. 489; Bermann, p. 594. 
20 cf. Hartley, p. 490; comp. Lenenbach, p. 267 et seq.; Kerwin, p. 929-930. 
21 In a normal two-forum case, an injunction will nowadays be granted if it is established that England is the 
"natural forum" defined as the forum with which the action has the closest connection, provided that this 
does not deprive the claimant in the foreign court of a legitimate advantage of which it would be unjust to 
deprive him (cf. Hartley, p. 490-493; Bermann, p. 617-619), whereas the availability of a jury trial or of a 
broader discovery are not benefits an English court should protect by an antisuit injunction (cf. Lowenfeld, 
p. 317). If an English antisuit injunction is requested in aid of a third jurisdiction which cannot enforce an 
antisuit injunction itself this is only possible if the English forum has a sufficient interest of its own in the 
case (cf. Airbus Industries GIE v. Patel, [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 631, 637 (H.L. 1998), that is the applicant 
must also in such a case establish that England is the natural forum (cf. Ambrose, p. 405-406; Anderson, 
p. 212-213). Apart from this general ground to enjoin a foreign proceeding, antisuit injunctions may also 
be granted in special circumstances; one of these is a contract under which the parties are obligated not 
to bring an action in a foreign forum, for instance if the jurisdiction of an English court or of an arbitral 
tribunal sitting in England is agreed upon in a forum-selection clause or an arbitration agreement (cf. 
58. In the United States too, the antisuit-injunction tool evolved from a tool to put sister-state 
proceedings in order, i.e. from a domestic tool, to a tool that was applied in international settings as 
well.22 
dd) Benefits of Antisuit Injunctions 
 
9. In a posture where actions relating to the same parties and issues are pending in different 
courts, antisuit injunctions concentrate an action in one court - the domestic court. This prevents (i) 
contradicting judgments, (ii) that the parties incur additional costs associated with concurrent litigation 
(iii) and that the dockets of the courts are overburdened. Antisuit injunctions therefore ensure 
procedural efficiency.23 In the international context, the inconveniences of concurrent proceedings so 
prevented might be more readily present than in sister-state cases.24 On the other hand, foreign 
relations are more fragile and may be negatively affected by antisuit injunctions.25 
ee) Forum non Conveniens 
 
10. The concept of forum non conveniens enables the domestic courts, based on a motion usually 
filed by the respondent, to deny its jurisdiction in favour of a more convenient forum. Such an order will 
be issued if there actually is an alternate forum and if the presumption in favour of the claimant’s choice 
of forum is overcome by private and public interest factors:26 The private factors include: relative ease 
 
Bermann, p. 623; Hartley, p. 494; Lenenbach, p. 270; Wilson, p. 215). Other such special grounds are 
certain defenses under English law (i) that make it unconscionable for the claimant to sue or (ii) prevent 
extraterritorial application of foreign law. 
22 cf. Bermann, p. 593. In sister-state cases, antisuit injunctions are issued when the proceedings are 
vexatious, to protect the forum or one of its public policies or in case an obligation not to sue in the sister-
state forum, e.g. as agreed upon in an arbitration agreement, has been breached (cf. idem, p. 594-597). 
23 cf. Victor v. Ortho Organizers, Inc., 932 F.Supp. 261, 263 (1996); American Horse Protection v. Lyng, 690 
F.Supp. 40, 45; comp. Krerotest v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183; International 
Fashion Products, B.V. v. Calvin Klein, Inc., 1995 WL 92321 2; Perry, p. 147; Sherman, p. 925; Werner, 
p. 1046 and 1052-1053. 
24 Additionally, Bermann points out that "most foreign jurisdictions cannot be expected … to decline 
jurisdiction on discretionary grounds such as forum non conveniens and thus [to] themselves police 
vexatious or oppressive litigation", which would justify the use of the antisuit injunction tool (cf. Bermann, 
p. 606-607 and 619-620). 
25 cf. idem; comp. paras. 18 et seq. hereinafter. 
26 cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-509. 
6of access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, 
the costs for obtaining willing witnesses and all other practical problems that make a trial expeditious 
and less expensive. The public factors include for instance avoiding to add further cases to courts with 
congested calendars, avoiding the imposition of the burden of jury duty upon people of a community 
which has no relationship to the litigation, promoting the local interest in having localized controversies 
settled at home and avoiding problems of conflict of laws. The court should also consider whether it is 
possible to include all potential parties in the alternate forum.27 The "ultimate inquiry is where trial will 
best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice".28 
11. Like an antisuit injunction, an order denying jurisdiction for forum non conveniens concentrates 
the dispute in one court. In contrast to an antisuit injunction, the decision on a motion for forum non 
conveniens is however limited to the jurisdiction of the domestic court and does not affect the 
proceedings before the foreign court. It is therefore only the jurisdiction of the domestic, not of the 
foreign court that is at stake. An antisuit injunction, where the domestic court expresses that it deems 
itself to be the proper court, can therefore be described as an offensive form of the forum-non-
conveniens tool.29 
b) Injunctions 
 
aa) Introduction 
 
12. Antisuit injunctions are a specific form of injunctive relief.30 It is therefore appropriate to pause 
and examine the principles that govern injunctive relief in general before going in medias res.
13. An injunction is a remedy that is designed to meet a real threat of a future wrong or a 
contemporary or past wrong likely to continue or recur.31 Injunctions are thus aimed at protecting 
 
27 cf. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 236-237; Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Company, 531 F.Supp. 710, 713. 
28 cf. Koster v. Lumbermens Mutuaol Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 527. 
29 comp. Bermann, p. 606-607 and 619-620. 
30 cf. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357, 364. 
31 cf. Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114-1115; Farmland Dairies v. McGuire, 789 F.Supp 
1243, 1250. 
7against future or continuing wrongful conduct rather than at restituting for injuries already inflicted.32
Injunctions are divided into (i) temporary restraining orders, issued for a brief period of time pending a 
hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction; (ii) preliminary injunctions, issued preliminarily to 
a hearing on the merits;33, 34 (iii) permanent injunctions issued with perpetual effect following a final 
hearing on the merits.35 Injunctive relief may, thus, be issued in the final order or as a provisional 
remedy.36 
bb) Injunctions as a Form of Equitable Relief 
 
14. Equitable relief arose to prevent inadequate judgments that resulted from the inability of the 
courts of law to "adapt judgments to the special circumstances of cases".37 Correspondingly, equitable 
relief aims to achieve fairness in a particular case38 and is only available if no appropriate remedy at law 
exists,39, 40 as is for instance the case when an irreparable injury or a multiplicity of suits shall be 
prevented.41 So, injunctions that are mainly issued for these purposes are considered to be a form of 
 
32 cf. Thomas v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 24 N.E. 24, 24-25. 
33 cf. National Basketball Association v. Minnesota Professional Basketball, Ltd. Partnership, 56 F.3d 866, 
872. 
34 So, a preliminary injunction aims at preserving the status quo until the court reaches the case’s merits. 
Once the matters to which the preliminary injunction pertained are decided in the final judgment or a 
permanent injunction, the preliminary injunction ceases to be in effect; (cf. Grupo Mexicano de Desarollo 
S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 315; Ireland v. Wynkoop, 36 Colo. App. 205, 225). 
35 cf. American Jurisprudence 2d, Injunctions §§ 7,8 and 10. 
36 cf. Jesse French Piano & Organ Co. v. Forbes 678, 680. 
37 cf. Thomas v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 24 N.E. 24, 25. 
38 Equity is perceived as "general fairness" (cf. Things Remembered Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 132). 
39 cf. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312; Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 
57. 
40 Actions at law and suits in equity are two separate systems of jurisprudence (cf. Armstrong Cork Co. v. 
Merchants’ Refrigerating Co., 184 F. 199, 204) administered by the same courts (cf. Corpus Juris 
Secundum, Equity § 4). Whether an action at law or a suit in equity is filed must be assessed based on 
the relief sought (cf. Corpus Juris Secundum, Actions § 126). While "in the action at law relief is almost 
invariably administered in the form of pecuniary compensation in damages for the injury received; in the 
other the court has discretionary power to adapt the relief to the circumstances of the case" (cf. Troster v. 
Dann, 145 N.Y.S. 56, 58). 
41 cf. Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 143 F.Supp. 826, 835 (fn. 3). As to the second case, an 
injunction is available to prevent a wrongful act if the complainant would be required to bring many actions 
against many persons in order to be made whole; in such a constellation, the remedies at law may be 
found to be inadequate (idem). 
8equitable relief.42 The fact that this kind of relief was created to enable the courts to adapt the remedy to 
secure fairness for the case in question43 evidences that the courts enjoy discretion when ruling on a 
request for equitable relief.44 This is also true for antisuit injunctions which are, as already pointed out,45 
a subspecies of injunctive relief.46 So, the end of fairness in a particular case shall be reached by the 
means of discretion of the court. This shall, according to the Supreme Court, secure "complete 
justice".47, 48, 49 
15. The discretion of a court whether to issue, and if so, to fashion the equitable remedy appropriate 
in the particular case,50 does not mean that "equity" is synonymous with "natural justice administered 
without fixed rules" - rather equity jurisdiction consists of a system of fixed rules and principles,51 
administered side by side with the common law.52 As to the principles governing the issuance of 
preliminary injunctions,53 the Supreme Court holds that such a request can be granted if the following 
criteria54 demonstrate a need to do so:55 
42 cf. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311; Philp v. Macri, 269 F.2d 945, 947. Ordering 
specific performance of a contract would for instance be an equitable remedy whereas the awarding of 
damages is a legal remedy (cf. Smith v. Tritram, 20 P.2d 770, 770; Troster v. Dann, 145 N.Y.S. 56, 58). 
43 cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329. 
44 cf. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312. 
45 Comp. para. 12 hereinabove. 
46 cf. Philp v. Macri, 269 F.2d 945, 947; Bermann, p. 629-630. 
47 Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. 497, 503. 
48 As a consequence thereof, the absence of precedents does not foreclose the exercise of equity 
jurisdiction (cf. American Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 38 F.Supp. 896, 921). 
49 It further follows from the goal of equity jurisdiction to establish fairness that equity can only be requested 
by one who conducts in good faith and in accordance with the "principles of equity and righteous dealing" 
(cf. American Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 38 F.Supp. 896, 921). 
50 cf. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Ziebarth, 520 N.W.2d 51, 56-57. Comp. the general proposition that 
equity is flexible (cf. Grupo Mexicano de Desarollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 322. 
51 cf. American Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 38 F. Supp. 896, 921. 
52 cf. Corpus Juris Secundum, Equity § 2. So, "equity" cannot, thus, be equated with "ex aequo et bono". 
53 The standards for granting a preliminary injunction are essentially the same as for a permanent injunction 
with the exception that the applicant must only establish a likelihood of success on the merits rather than 
actual success (cf. Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 546). 
54 The individual factors are "factors to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be met" (cf. Teamsters 
Local Unions Nos. 75 and 200 v. Barry Trucking Inc., 176 F.3d 1004, 1011; in re DeLorean Motor Co., 
755 F.2d 1223, 1229), in particular, the "stronger the likelihood that the plaintiff will win, the less of a 
showing he need make that the denial of the preliminary injunction would hurt him more than granting it 
would hurt the defendant" (cf. Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 465) and vice 
9(i) Inadequacy of remedies at law56, 57, 58, 59 and, connected therewith;60
(ii) Necessity61 for injunctive relief to prevent either (i) irreparable62 harm63, 64, that would 
otherwise likely occur,65 or (ii) a multiplicity of suits;66, 67, 68 
versa (cf. Standard Register Co. v. Cleaver, 30 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1099; American Jurisprudence 2d, 
Injunctions § 16; comp., however, U.S. v. Rural Elec. Convenience Co-op. Co., 922 F.2d 429, 432; United 
Offshore Company v. Southern Deepwater Pipeline Company, 899 F.2d 405, 408, where the Courts of 
Appeals for the Fifth and the Seventh Circuit held that each element of the test must be established - 
without, however, detailing the degree of the showing and the interdependence between the elements). 
55 The relevant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing injunctions does not alter these prerequisites for 
equitable relief (cf. Grupo Mexicano de Desarollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318-
319); when a statute specifically provides for injunctions, however, the above prerequisites need not be 
established (cf. Henderson v. Burd, 133 F.2d 515, 517). 
56 cf. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312; Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 
57; Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88; Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506. 
57 This is the case, if the remedies at law which are available when equitable relief is sought cannot fully 
repair the wrong done to the person seeking relief (cf. Thomas v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 24 N.E. 
24, 25), i.e. cannot certainly, reasonably promptly and practicably preclude the potential harm from 
realizing (cf. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214). Where e.g. the payment of money pursuant to a 
final award produces an adequate result, an injunction is not available (cf. Armour & Co. v. City of Dallas, 
255 U.S. 280, 287). 
58 A permanent injunction may also be ordered as "attendant" (American Jurisprudence 2d, Injunctions § 10) 
to an underlying cause of action if the applicant prevails on the merits (cf. Intervisual Communications, 
Inc. v. Volkert, 975 F.Supp. 1092, 1104). 
59 The fact that a statute provides for a remedy does not entail (i) that this remedy must be considered the 
appropriate remedy for all sets of facts to which the statute applies and (ii) that the statutory remedy per 
se excludes equitable remedies; generally spoken, the introduction of a statutory form of action only 
abolishes the formal distinction, but not the inherent distinction between legal and equitable principles (cf. 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Actions § 130). Rather, even if the statute provides for injunctive relief, 
injunctions based on equity are still available unless the statute makes it clear that this shall not be the 
case (cf. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313; Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 
398; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329; Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. 497, 503). 
60 cf. Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506; Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 
143 F.Supp. 826, 835 (fn. 3). Mostly the lack of an adequate remedy at law on one side and the threat of 
irreparable harm or multiple suits on the other hand are listed as separate prerequisites although the latter 
is the consequence of the first (cf. e.g. U.S. v. Rural Elec. Convenience Co-op. Co., 922 F.2d 429, 432). 
61 cf. Town of Haddam v. LaPointe, 42 Conn. App. 631, 639. A court does in particular not grant injunctions 
that are inefficient, of no benefit to the complainant (cf. Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 
U.S. 515, 550) or impossible to comply with, since "equity will not do a vain thing" (cf. Local 1115 v. 
Hialeah Convalescent Home, Inc., 348 F.Supp. 405, 415; American Jurisprudence 2d, Injunctions § 21). 
62 Harm is irreparable when the applicant cannot be made whole by an award of damages or other legal 
remedies (cf. Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 332). 
63 cf. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 358; Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 
527 U.S. 308, 340; Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312; Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 
932; Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57; Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88. 
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(iii) Likelihood69 of success,70 or showing that the merits of the claim present a serious 
question for litigation;71
(iv) Balancing of possible harms to the parties72 and the public.73, 74 
64 Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 points out that for a preliminary 
injunction to be granted it must be established that, although an equitable remedy exists at the time of the 
final award, irreparable harm will be suffered if no preliminary injunction is ordered. That is, the applicant 
must establish that he cannot "easily wait to the end of the trial". The threat of irreparable harm must, in 
other words, be imminent and real (cf. U.S. v. Oregon State Medical Soc., 343 U.S. 236, 333; Shapiro v. 
Cadman Towers, Inc.,. 51 F.3d 328, 332; McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171, 1182). When 
he requests a preliminary injunction, the applicant must in other words establish that the injunction is 
necessary at a time before the final hearing takes place, i.e. that his case is urgent. 
65 cf. Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc.,. 51 F.3d 328, 333. 
66 cf. Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 143 F.Supp. 826, 835 (fn. 3). 
67 The term "multiplicity" encompasses simultaneous suits as well as efforts to re-litigate an issue already 
decided (cf. Rudinicki v. McCormack, 210 F.Supp. 905, 910). 
68 Equity "favors the prevention of a multiplicity of actions", involving "the same issues of law or fact" 
between the same parties (cf. Mathew v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 529-530; American Jurisprudence 2d, 
Injunctions § 38). When there are different individuals on one side, an injunction conditions that the suits 
involve an interest all the parties have in common, i.e. that the suits be not "separate controversies 
unconnected [with each other as to] issues of fact" and questions of law (cf. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. 
McKnight, 244 U.S. 368, 375)) in order to prevent a person from "being subjected to undue costs and 
inconvenience" (cf. Public Nat. Bank of New York v. Keating, 47 F.2d 561, 562-563).  
69 The applicant must make a "prima facie showing of his right to relief" (cf. Gambar Enterprises, Inc. v. Kelly 
Services, Inc., 69 A.D.2d 297, 298). 
70 cf. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 358; Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 
527 U.S. 308, 340 Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 932. 
71 cf. Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc.,. 51 F.3d 328, 332; Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 
F.3d, 119, 122. 
72 A court must weigh the benefits and burdens of granting or denying a requested injunction on both 
parties. An injunction may be granted (i) when this test shows that the potential harm of the applicant is 
bigger than that of the other interested parties. (cf. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 69), (ii) or 
when the harm the applicant is threatened with is of such a degree that an injunction is equitable even if it 
burdens even bigger inconvenience to the other party (cf. American Jurisprudence 2d, Injunctions § 37). 
73 cf. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 358; Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414, 440; City of Harrisonville, Mo. v. W. 
S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Col, 289 U.S. 334, 337. 
74 Thus, even if there is irreparable harm an injunction may be denied (cf Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 
456 U.S. 305, 312-313; Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414, 440; Railroad Comm'n. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 
496, 500) because the complainant is not entitled to an injunction as a matter of right (cf. Yakus v. U.S., 
321 U.S. 414, 440; Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 68). Rather, also in such a case a court 
must use its discretion whether to grant an injunction by balancing the interests of the parties (cf. Banks v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F.Supp. 850, 856). The court may for instance consider: (i) the 
conduct of the complainant (delay, clean-hands principle; cf. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. 
Thompson, 281 U.S. 331, 337-338); (ii) the substantiality of the threat faced by the complainant (cf State 
of Nebraska v. State of Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 2); and (iii) difficulties in framing or enforcing an effective 
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cc) Injunctions Ordering the Specific Performance of Contracts 
 
16. Injunctions are also available to enjoin the violation of a contract and, thus, to order its specific 
performance.75 Whether a preliminary injunction ordering the performance of a contract is appropriate, 
must be assessed based on the regular criteria listed in para. 15 hereinabove,76 by taking the specific 
circumstances of the case into account.77 If a permanent injunction is sought, the applicant must 
moreover establish the conditions for a judgment ordering specific performance of the contract.78
17. When injunctive relief is sought because of a breach of contract, the prerequisite of irreparable 
harm79 is satisfied, if either "the subject matter of the contract is of such a special nature or peculiar 
value that damages would be inadequate; or [… if …] some special and practical features of the 
contract, [render] it […] impossible to ascertain the legal measure of loss so that money damages are 
 
order (cf. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Ross, 152 P.2d 675, 678). Moreover, the court should, when using its 
discretion, bear in mind (i) that injunctive relief ordinarily protects against unperformed acts, thus restricts 
the freedom of action of the party that is affected by such order (ii) and that injunctive relief must, 
therefore, be an extraordinary remedy (cf. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312; Fox Valley 
Harvestone, Inc. v. A. O. Smith Harvestone Products, Inc., 545 F.2d 1096, 1097), which should 
consequently - as a general guideline - only be used "sparingly, and only in a clear case" cf. Rizzo v. 
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378; Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 
F.3d 357, 363-364). 
75 cf. United Mine Workers of America Dist. No. 5 v. Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806, 812. 
76 cf. Teamsters Local Unions Nos. 75 and 200 v. Barry Trucking Inc., 176 F.3d 1004, 1011. When 
contractual rights are concerned, the criterion of likelihood of success normally entails that a preliminary 
injunction will not be granted if the contractual rights of the applicant are doubtful (cf. Consolidated Canal 
Co. v. Mesa Canal Col, 177 U.S. 296, 302). Even in these cases, it may, however, be adequate to 
preserve the status quo pending the final determination of the right in question (cf. American 
Jurisprudence 2d, Injunctions § 15). 
77 comp. Ireland v. Wynkoop, 36 Colo. App. 205, 221. 
78 I.e. (i) that there is a valid contract, that (ii) the plaintiff has performed its part of the contract, and that (iii) 
plaintiff and defendant are each able to continue performing their parts of the contract (cf. Nemer Jeep-
Eagle, Inc. v. Jeep-Eagle Sales Corp., 992 F.2d 430, 433-434). Even then, such an injunction will be 
denied if specific performance is not appropriate under the circumstances (cf. Ireland v. Wynkoop, 36 
Colo. App. 205, 225; American Jurisprudence 2d, Injunctions § 123). 
79 A contractor who faces possible future harm may request injunctive relief before he actually suffers harm 
(cf. Overholt Crop Ins. Sercie Co. Travis, 941 F.2d 1361, 1371). 
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impracticable".80 So, if damages are assessable and readily and fully compensate the applicant for the 
breach of a contractual obligation by his counterparty, there is an adequate remedy at law for the 
applicant, so that injunctive relief cannot be granted.81 
B. Comity 
 
18. Antisuit injunctions are addressed to the parties; nonetheless, they de facto also affect the 
sovereignty of the foreign forum:82 A court enjoining a foreign proceeding effectively denies the 
jurisdiction of the foreign court, and by doing so "regulat[es] the affairs of the foreign sovereign".83 The 
foreign forum will therefore consider an antisuit injunction to be an interference with its sovereignty and 
for this reason hardly ever recognize and enforce it.84, 85, 86 That is shown by Grand Trunk Western 
Railroad evidencing the reaction of a court, the Supreme Court of Illinois, which is faced with an antisuit 
injunction. In this case the court reasoned that the injunction destroyed its jurisdiction and that it should 
be entitled to the same respect for its jurisdiction that it accords to other courts; it therefore held that it 
was absent such respect able to protect its jurisdiction by issuing a counter-antisuit injunction.87 This 
 
80 cf. ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, 809 F.2d 223, 226; Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 
380, 386. 
81 cf. Compute-A-Call, Inc. v. Tolleson, 285 Ark. 355, 356. 
82 cf. Stonington Partners, Inc. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products, N.V., 310 F.3d 118,126; Laker 
Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 927; Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Company of 
North America, 651 F.2d 877, 887 ("… there is no difference between an injunction to the parties and 
addressing it to the foreign court itself"); James v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company, 14 Ill.2d 356, 
368 and 372 ("destroys our jurisdiction"); Turner v. Gromit, C-159/02, Judgment of the European Court of 
Justice of April 27, 2004, N 27; Bermann, p. 589; Hartley, p. 506; Najarian, p. 973-974. The formalistic 
view that an antisuit injunction is solely directed at the parties is for instance applied in Cole v. 
Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 118-119. 
83 cf. Schimek, p. 517 and 521. 
84 Although a court may recognize an antisuit injunction issued by another court, it is not required to do so 
(cf. American Jurisprudence 2d, Injunctions § 198; comp. fn. 17 hereinabove.). 
85 For domestic cases, see James v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company, 14 Ill.2d 356, 364, holding 
that comity did not require a court to discontinue the action before it in such a case. 
86 Nonetheless, an antisuit injunction is effective when the forum has personal jurisdiction over the enjoined 
party and is able to enforce it by contempt of court measures or the like (cf. e.g. James v. Grand Trunk 
Western Railroad Company, 14 Ill.2d 356, 359; according to the facts mentioned in this decision, one 
party was arrested and threatened with imprisonment in case of non-compliance with an antisuit 
injunction).  
87 cf. James v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company, 14 Ill.2d 356, 371-372. 
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domestic example shows that antisuit injunctions have the potential to lead to frictions between different 
fora, and to harm judicial cooperation.88 
19. An unlimited use of the antisuit-injunction tool would therefore conflict with the means and goals 
of one of the guiding principles of American jurisprudence, comity towards foreign sovereigns:89 The 
means of comity, avoiding interference with other nations when tailoring remedies,90, 91 aim at 
promoting predictability and stability in legal expectations,92 as well as at furthering the respect for the 
American legal system and the smooth cooperation between the judicial systems of different 
sovereigns (the ends of comity). Antisuit injunctions do and effect the opposite. What the two concepts, 
comity and the antisuit-injunction tool, have in common is that they both aim to foster (different) 
domestic interests: While antisuit injunctions aim to protect the integrity of the American judicial system, 
comity aims to facilitate international judicial cooperation and thus, indirectly international commerce,93 
which certainly is in the interest of the American economy, which does business on a global level.94 So, 
comity towards other nations as well is not without self-interest either. 
20. "Comity" is not a clearly defined legal principle. It does not provide precise criteria when a 
foreign litigation shall not be interfered with. Comity rather stands for an idea than for a specific content. 
Moreover, comity does not entail a mandatory deference to the foreign forum. This deference is a 
"unilateral decision of the forum",95 which is not required by international law.96 On the other hand it is a 
 
88 cf. Lenenbach, p. 295. 
89 cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-203; Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems, 369 F.3d 645, 652; China 
Trade v. M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33, 36; Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 927 and 937; Farrell 
Lines Incorporated v. Columbus Cello-Polly Corporation, 32 F.Supp.2d 118, 129; Smoothline Ltd. and 
Greatsino Electronic Ltd. v. North American Foreign Trading Corp., 2002 WL 273301, 6; In re Laitasalo, 
196 B.R. 913, 920; American Jurisprudence 2d, Injunctions § 195. 
90 cf. Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 75. 
91 In the context of a concurrent litigation, the litigation itself is the foreign act deserving consideration under 
the principle of comity. 
92 cf. China Trade v. M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33, 35; Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 937; Amkor 
Technology v. Alcatel Business Systems, 278 F.Supp.2d 519, 525; Schimek, p. 503-504. 
93 cf. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore, Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-9. 
94 cf. Maier, p. 281 and 303-304; Swanson, p. 10-11. 
95 cf. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 937; Maier, p. 281. 
96 cf. Swanson, p. 4. 
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legal principle and not mere good will upon the other.97 Comity thus stands for a "blend of courtesy and 
expedience",98, 99 and a court consequently enjoys a certain degree of discretion whether to defer to a 
foreign sovereign, as it has when ruling on a request for injunctive relief. 
21. The focus of this paper lies with international antisuit injunctions, i.e. with cases where the 
forbidden forum is outside the United States. In such an international context, the principles of comity 
and mutual respect are "even more compelling",100 and considerations relating to disposition and 
conservation of judicial resources have less weight than in a purely domestic context.101 Moreover, as 
sovereignty is paramount to any sovereign, the court of a foreign sovereign may be expected to be 
alienated to a higher degree than another court within the same sovereign when confronted with an 
antisuit injunction. And, as the world grows closer together, the relations between the sovereigns and 
thus comity between them becomes more and more important.102 Courts seized with international 
matters should therefore pay due regard to the principles of comity.103 Otherwise, i.e. when one 
sovereign seeks exclusive control over activities also affecting foreign sovereigns,104 and tries to 
impose its values on foreign sovereigns,105 such a lack of comity could harm economic and social 
 
97 cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-164. 
98 cf. Canadian Filters v. Lear Siegler, 412 F.2d 577, 578. 
99 Recognition of the acts of another sovereign should under the principle of comity only be withheld when 
its acceptance would be "contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to give it effect" 
(cf. Stonington Partners, Inc. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products, N.V., 310 F.3d 118, 126), so that a 
judgment of a foreign court affecting a thing or person within its jurisdiction should be deferred to (cf. 
Raushenbush, p. 1065). 
100 cf. Sea Containers Ltd. v. Stena AB, 890 F.2d 1205, 1213; contra: Allendale Mutual Insurance Company 
v. Bull Data, Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431; Mutual Service Insurance v. Frit Industries, Inc., 805 F.Supp. 919, 
923. 
101 cf. Sea Containers Ltd. v. Stena AB, 890 F.2d 1205, 1213; Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 927 
(fn. 49); see, however, Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 531 F.Supp. 710, 715. 
The counterargument being that "[t]his increasingly is one world and we have difficulty seeing why the … 
rules for limiting duplicative litigation should stop at international boundaries" (cf. Philipps Medical 
Systems International, B.V. v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 605). 
102 cf. Schimek, p. 499. 
103 Comity also favors the enforcement of forum selection clauses (cf. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore, Co., 
407 U.S. 1, 8-9) and arbitration agreements (cf. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver 417 U.S. 506). 
104 cf. Schimek, p. 503. 
105 cf. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore, Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-9; Maier, p. 303-304. 
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development and could, according to several scholars, lead to frictions between sovereigns.106, 107 
106 cf. Maier, p. 303-304; Schimek, p. 503-504; Swanson, p. 2 and 8-10. 
107 It may even be questioned, whether antisuit injunctions are, given their effect, consistent with the principle 
of equality of sovereigns, which is acknowledged by public international law. (cf. Lenenbach, p. 293-294). 
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C. Antisuit Injunction Act 
 
22. In order to achieve "harmony … by avoiding … friction between two systems of courts",108 
Congress enacted the Antisuit Injunction Act.109 Pursuant to this act federal courts may enjoin litigations 
in state actions110 only when this is expressly authorized by an Act of Congress,111 or where an antisuit 
injunction is necessary to protect jurisdiction,112, 113 or a prior judgment by the court which is requested 
to enjoin the state-court action.114, 115 The other way round state courts may, according to City of Dallas,
not enjoin actions in federal courts.116 This decision and the Antisuit Injunction Act show a certain 
reticence towards the antisuit injunction tool when different domestic sovereigns, the Federation and 
 
108 cf. Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d 252, 261. 
109 cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2283. 
110 That a federal court can enjoin the prosecution of an action before another federal court is "clear" 
(American Horse Protection v. Lyng, 690 F.Supp. 40, 42). 
111 Federal courts may only enjoin state-court proceedings under the "in aid of its jurisdiction" exception 
based on the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. § 1651) when a state court "so interferes with the federal court's 
consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority to 
decide that case" (cf. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 
295; Peters v. Brants Grocery, 990 F.Supp. 1337, 1341). So, the All Writs Act provides a legal basis for a 
federal court to enjoin a party from proceeding in a state-court if such an injunction is necessary to 
preserve or exercise subject matter jurisdiction (cf. Peters v. Brants Grocery, 990 F.Supp. 1337, 1341). 
112 The simple fact that a state court might in a concurrent-litigation case come to a decision before the 
federal court does, so that only few issues would be left to decide for the federal court, is not sufficient 
grounds to intervene with the state court proceedings, but is a consequence of the nation’s dual system 
(cf. National Basketball Association v. Minnesota Professional Basketball, Ltd. Partnership, 56 F.3d 866, 
872). 
113 comp. paras. 40 et seq. hereinafter. 
114 The reason why federal courts may only in exceptional circumstances enjoin state-court proceedings is 
that the states did not surrender their power to establish a judicial system of their own when the United 
States were formed (cf. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 
285). 
115 An antisuit injunction is admissible in casu if the following conditions are satisfied: (i) the same issues are 
in dispute in the later proceeding; (ii) the later proceeding is between the same parties; (iii) the party 
bringing the later suit must have had the opportunity to present its case; (iv) a final judgment was 
rendered in the first proceeding; (v) and the general conditions for granting injunctive relief must be 
satisfied - success being established by success in the first action, irreparable harm being established by 
the fact that re-litigation constitutes irreparable harm and the balance of interests being in disfavour of re-
litigation as public interests aims at avoiding it (cf. in re SDDS, Inc., 97 F.3d 1030, 1040-1041; cf. para. 15 
hereinabove).  
116 cf. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412-413. 
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the States, are involved.117 
23. Although City of Dallas and the Antisuit Injunction Act, as well as the policies underlying them 
are not directly applicable if the forbidden forum is abroad, they may give guidelines for an approach to 
international antisuit injunctions.118 Indeed, as these policies aim to ensure that (i) judicial comity, i.e. 
that a court of one sovereign should be reluctant to interfere with the courts of another sovereign, which 
is even more important in an international context,119 and (ii) judicial federalism, i.e. that the judicial 
sovereign on the federal level and on the state level operate essentially independently despite their 
frequently overlapping subject matter jurisdiction,120 are respected,121 suggests that also proceedings 
pending in a foreign sovereign should be enjoined with reticence only. 
 
D. Foreign Models 
 
a) Introduction 
 
24. The following paragraphs give a short overview over two systems outside the United States: The 
Swiss and the Lugano-Convention approach to concurrent litigations and antisuit injunctions. The 
second analysis in particular aims to examine whether a convention may have an impact on the 
authority of a sovereign to enjoin foreign proceedings. 
 
b) Swiss Approach towards non-Signatories of the Lugano-Convention 
 
25. In principle, a Swiss court implements the principles of lis pendens and res iudicata: (i) It will 
stay an action submitted to it if the subject-matter is already pending before a foreign tribunal,122 and on 
 
117 For antisuit injunctions among federal and state courts, comp. fn. 22 and 110 hereinabove. 
118 cf. Mutual Service Insurance v. Frit Industries, Inc., 805 F.Supp. 919, 922 (fn. 2) and 923 (fn. 5); comp. 
Robertson, p. 411, 427-429 and 431 who submits that the same standards as under the Antisuit Injunction 
Act should apply in an international context. 
119 comp. para. 21 hereinabove. 
120 Given this reasoning and the fact that foreign courts are for federal courts, like state courts, courts of 
another sovereign, this supports that international antisuit injunctions should only be issued when one of 
the exceptions of the Antisuit Injunction Act applies. 
121 cf. Werner, p. 1063-1064. 
122 Art. 9 of the Swiss Federal Act on International Private Law (SR 291) provides: (1) If an action concerning 
the same subject matter between the same parties is already pending abroad, the Swiss court shall stay 
the matter if it may be expected that the foreign court will, within a reasonable period of time, render a 
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the other hand not recognize a judgment rendered in a foreign action that was filed after the Swiss 
action (lis pendens).123 (ii) And it will dismiss an action that is submitted to it when there is already a 
foreign decision on the issues that are to be tried in the Swiss court if this foreign judgment is 
recognizable in Switzerland (res iudicata).124 By putting the stress on which court is seized first, (i) there 
cannot be, from a Swiss perspective, concurrent litigations and (ii) it is ensured that there are no 
conflicting judgments within Switzerland - irrespective of whether a Swiss or a foreign court decides 
first.125 
26. Antisuit injunctions to enforce on foreign sovereigns the Swiss view on which judgment should 
be recognized are not available. Also, if a foreign action is filed to evade a Swiss public policy, this only 
entails that the foreign judgment is not recognized in Switzerland, while antisuit injunctions are not 
available. It transpires the notion that (i) someone who has ties with a foreign sovereign that are close 
enough for that sovereign to assume jurisdiction and to enforce the judgment there or in a third forum 
accepts the risk that this may occur and that (ii) the jurisdiction to enforce plays an important role: If a 
foreign judgment can be enforced in the foreign or a third forum, there is no legal ground for a Swiss 
court to preclude the foreign judgment and its enforcement; it is limited to denying enforcement of the 
foreign judgment within Switzerland.126 
decision recognizable in Switzerland. (2) To determine when a claim is pending in Switzerland, the time of 
the first procedural act required for the bringing of a claim shall be conclusive. The introduction of a 
conciliation proceeding shall be sufficient. (3) The Swiss court shall dismiss the action when a foreign 
decision recognizable in Switzerland is submitted to it. 
123 cf. Art. 27(2)(c) of the Swiss Federal Act on International Private Law. 
124 Depending on the kind of case at issue, the conditions that a foreign award must satisfy to be 
recognizable in Switzerland may vary. 
125 Provided that the foreign decision is enforceable in Switzerland, which it is if the foreign forum has 
reasonable contacts to the facts. 
126 The Swiss court may, however, be forced to take the foreign judgment into account for its own decision, 
i.e. tailor its judgment in a way that considers the effects of a foreign judgment not recognizable in 
Switzerland (cf. Schwander, N 695). 
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c) Lugano-Convention 
 
27. The Lugano Convention127 between the members of the European Union and the members of 
the European Free Trade Association128 defines the competent courts for civil and commercial 
matters129 and provides that judicial decisions made in one signatory must be recognized and enforced 
by the other signatories.130 With regard to concurrent litigations, the Lugano Convention implements the 
principle of lis pendens: The court, which was seized second, must stay proceedings until the court, 
which was seized first, decides on its jurisdiction; if the court, which was seized first, upholds its 
jurisdiction, the other court must dismiss the case.131, 132 The Lugano Convention thus allocates the 
jurisdiction for each case to the courts of one signatory and thus creates a single judicial system among 
the signatories. The judgment rendered by the courts of that signatory must then be enforced by the 
other signatories. That the courts of one signatory accept a decision of another signatory even if the 
domestic courts would have been competent as well,133, 134 expresses the mutual trust of the 
signatories in each other’s judicial systems.135 An essential part of this mutual trust is the persuasion 
that the courts of each signatory are as apt to correctly interpret the Lugano Convention as the 
 
127 Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judicial Decisions in Civil and Commercial Matters of 
September 16, 1988 (the "Lugano Convention" or "LC").  
128 The Lugano Convention extended the system created by the Brussels-Convention entered into by the 
members of the European Union to the countries then members of the European Free Trade Association, 
i.e. Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Austria, Finland and Sweden 
subsequently joined the European Union. 
129 cf. Art. 2 et seq. LC. 
130 cf. Art. 25 et seq. LC (save for a few, limited grounds for exceptions, like res iudicata (cf. Art. 27 Nr. 3 
LC)). In particular, it is not possible for the court before which enforcement is sought to re-examine the 
jurisdiction of the court which rendered the respective decision (except if the jurisdiction is based on 
provisions in titles III to IV LC; comp. Art. 28 LC and Lenenbach, p. 316). 
131 cf. Art. 21 LC. 
132 If two related actions are brought before the courts of two sovereigns, the court, which was seized 
second, may stay the proceedings and transfer the proceeding before it, upon a request by one of the 
parties, to the court, which was seized first if this court has jurisdiction over both actions (cf. Art. 22 LC). 
133 Because there are different alternative criteria to determine which court is competent in the particular 
case, it is not unusual that the courts of several signatories might uphold their jurisdiction based on the 
Lugano Convention. In such a case, it is decisive where the action is brought first. 
134 But were not applied to or only after the foreign court had been applied to. 
135 cf. Turner v. Gromit, C-159/02, Judgment of the European Court of Justice of April 27, 2004, N 24; Bell, p. 
207. 
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domestic courts.136 
28. Great Britain is a signatory to the Lugano Convention and is one of the countries which issue 
antisuit injunctions.137 The question arises whether the system created by the Lugano Convention 
precludes the British courts from issuing injunctions that enjoin actions before the courts of another 
signatory. The Lugano Convention does not expressly mention antisuit injunctions. Thus the question 
arises whether this tool is compatible or conflicts with the purpose and spirit of the Lugano 
Convention.138 This analysis might provide a starting point for the analysis of the relationship of another 
convention, the New York Convention, and antisuit injunctions, which will be addressed in Part V. 
29. The Lugano Convention allocates jurisdiction between the courts of the signatories. A court 
which is competent under a provision of the Lugano Convention has jurisdiction to decide the action 
before it. Consequently, there is no need to establish with which forum the action has the closest 
connection; a signatory to the Lugano Convention cannot be presumed to have the power to alter the 
system established by it. Therefore, there is no room for discretion or a notion of a "natural forum", one 
of the grounds for a British tribunal to issue an antisuit injunction.139 In particular, when an action is 
already pending before a foreign forum, an injunction enjoining that action would conflict with the 
principle of lis pendens set forth in Art. 21 LC.140 The context is slightly different when an action is first 
pending before a domestic court141 or when a decision has already been rendered in the domestic 
court, that is faced with a request to enjoin a proceeding before the courts of another signatory. In these 
settings, the domestic court does not conflict with the principles of lis pendens and res iudicata by 
issuing an antisuit injunction, but strives to ensure that these principles are not violated by the foreign 
court. 
30. The pattern of the Lugano Convention provides reasons for and against antisuit injunctions in 
 
136 cf. idem N 25. 
137 cf. fn. 21 hereinabove. 
138 cf. Stone, p. 145. 
139 comp. fn. 21 hereinabove. 
140 cf. Lenenbach, p. 312-314; comp. Bell, p. 205-206. 
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such a posture: On the one hand, an antisuit injunctions ensures that the provisions on jurisdiction and 
enforcement of the Lugano Convention are given effect; on the other hand antisuit injunctions show a 
mistrust that the other signatories apply the Lugano Convention correctly. In scholarly writing, there 
seems to be an agreement that the second reasoning should prevail, i.e. that in "the absence of a 
jurisdiction or arbitration agreement, it would be contrary to the Brussels Convention" to enjoin an 
action before the courts of another signatory.142 This view is confirmed by the European Court of 
Justice, which held that an antisuit injunction is an infringement of the jurisdiction of the foreign court, 
which is incompatible with the Brussels Convention,143 and that it would evidence mistrust towards the 
other signatory, which is at odds with the spirit of the Lugano Convention. This convincing reasoning 
also applies to the parallel Lugano Convention. 
31. The Lugano Convention also contains a provision on forum selection-clauses in Art. 17 LC. If 
the conditions of this provision are satisfied, a court that is applied to in violation of the forum-selection 
clause must deny its jurisdiction and dismiss the case. A delicate situation arises when an action is first 
brought to a court other than the selected forum and this court deems the forum-selection clause to be 
invalid, while the selected forum considers the forum-selection clause to be valid.144 In such a case, it is 
for the court which is seized first to decide whether there is a valid forum-selection clause:145 One might 
object that forum-selection clauses are so "incredibly important", that they justify to issue antisuit 
injunctions in such a case; indeed the enforcement of agreements is desirable.146 Several reasons 
point, however, in the other direction: First, there is no presumption (i) that the forum-selection clause is 
 
141 If the suit is neither pending in the domestic nor in a foreign court, it is submitted that an antisuit injunction 
is not admissible as this might de facto conflict with allocation of jurisdiction as provided for in the Lugano 
Convention. 
142 cf. Ambrose, p. 414; Bell, p. 206-207; von Houtte, p. 92; Lenenbach, p. 307; Stone, p. 144-145; contra: 
Lenenbach, p. 312, submitting that Art. 21 vests in the court first seized the power to enjoin proceedings 
in a foreign forum that is seized thereafter. 
143 cf. Turner v. Gromit, C-159/02, Judgment of the European Court of Justice of April 27, 2004, N 24-25 and 
27. 
144 Comp. the Continental Bank v. Aeakos Compania Naviera case ([1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 505) and the two 
perspectives on this case discussed by Wilson, p. 217-219. 
145 cf. Bell, p. 206-208. 
146 cf. Wilson, p. 221.  
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valid and (ii) that the forum the parties selected must therefore first examine whether the requirements 
of Art. 17 LC are satisfied. In fact, this would contradict the general pattern of the Lugano 
Convention:147 Even though Art. 17 LC harmonizes the standards for forum-selection clauses, some 
aspects, like the question of construction, will be addressed under national law so that a different 
outcome, e.g. as to the scope of the clause, is possible.148 This confirms that different opinions on 
whether a forum-selection clause is valid, cannot be a reason to enjoin a litigation in another signatory. 
The existence of diverging opinions is compatible with the Lugano Convention. Second, the principle of 
lis pendens suggests that the court that is seized first is the first to examine its jurisdiction and thus the 
forum-selection clause. And given the mutual trust between the signatories,149 there seems to be no 
justification to assume that the foreign court misapplies the Lugano Convention. Third, a judgment was 
rendered in breach of a forum-selection clause is not a ground to refuse recognition and enforcement 
under the Lugano Convention.150 So, an antisuit injunction conflicts with the mechanism and the spirit of 
the Lugano Convention even if this injunctions aims to implement forum-selection clauses.151 
32. It may thus be summarized that (i) the pattern of the Lugano Convention, in particular the stress 
that is put on lis pendens, (ii) the fact that jurisdiction is examined based on the same requirements in 
all signatories and (iii) the mutual trust that the Lugano-Convention will be applied correctly by all 
signatories, which is for instance expressed in the fact that the enforcing court shall not second-guess 
the jurisdiction of the court which rendered the decision, are hostile to antisuit injunctions by British 
courts against actions pending in another signatory, even if there is allegedly a forum-selection clause 
providing of the jurisdiction of British courts. 
 
147 cf. Bell, p. 206-208; comp. Briggs/Rees, N 5.39 (p. 374). 
148 cf. Bell, p. 208. 
149 cf. Turner v. Gromit, C-159/02, Judgment of the European Court of Justice of April 27, 2004, N 24; Bell, p. 
207. 
150 cf. Bell, p. 205. 
151 cf. Bell, p. 206-207; comp. Ambrose, p. 402 and Leigh, analyzing the impact of Turner v. Gromit on that 
issue. 
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E. Summary 
 
33. The authority of American courts to enjoin a party from continuing a concurrent foreign 
proceeding is undisputed.152 Nonetheless, as doing so, at least indirectly, affects a foreign sovereign 
and thus conflicts with the - rather vague - principle of comity, the fact that there is a concurrent court 
proceedings is not "without more" a reason to enjoin the foreign proceeding.153, 154, 155 Therefore, 
American courts should only use their discretion to issue antisuit injunctions in such a posture if there is 
some other ground for equitable relief than the mere fact of the pendency of the concurrent suits.156 An 
analysis of the Lugano Convention has shown that the existence of an international convention may 
have an effect on the availability of the antisuit injunction tool. Moreover, the policies behind the Antisuit 
Injunction Act suggest that antisuit injunctions should be issued with care when different sovereigns are 
involved. Part II examines how American courts put the pieces of this puzzle together. Part III suggests 
an alternative approach, which takes into account that antisuit injunctions are, lastly, a subcategory of 
injunctive relief. 
 
152 cf. para. 3 hereinabove. 
153 cf. Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 126 F.3d 365, 372; Gau Shan v. Bankers Trust, 
956 F.2d 1349, 1355; China Trade and Development Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36; Laker 
Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 915, 926and 928; Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance 
Company of North America, 651 F.2d 877, 887; Baer, p. 164, 167 and 173. 
154 This is further supported by the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court held that, as a consequence of the 
federal system, it must be accepted that a case is concurrently pending before several courts where 
adjudication before a single judge would be possible (cf. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928). 
This is even more true in the global environment where the different sovereigns coexist on the same level. 
155 Thus, each forum that has jurisdiction according to its law is free to proceed to a judgment and concurrent 
jurisdiction is "ordinarily to be respected" for the same in personam claim (cf. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 
731 F.2d 909, 926), so that under normal circumstances none of the courts is required to abstain from the 
action based on the principle of lis pendens (cf. Bermann, p. 611). 
156 cf. Philip v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945, 947. 
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III. AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE - PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER 
 
A. Comity-Threshold 
 
34. Antisuit injunctions de facto affect the domestic affairs of a foreign sovereign,157 and, by doing 
so, collide with the principle of comity.158 On the other hand, they do secure procedural efficiency and 
the integrity of the domestic proceedings.159 So, there is a conflict between those concerns and comity. 
To avoid this conflict, a foreign proceeding should only be enjoined if no less intrusive measure is 
available to implement the benefits of antisuit injunctions; if no such alternative measure is available, 
the domestic court has to weigh the conflicting interests.160 If comity were not considered, an antisuit 
injunction would become "nothing more than an aggressive attempt to seize exclusive jurisdiction".161 
35. Weighing the conflicting interests is, however, not an easy task to do since the extent of the 
duties comity imposes is uncertain.162 That subtlety of this task is evidenced by fact that the courts 
apply different standards although they agree that the starting point is that the principles of "comity 
counsel that injunctions restraining foreign litigation be used sparingly and granted only with care and 
great restraint".163 Since this statement is as vague as the principle of comity itself and does not provide 
adequate guidance to determine when comity is outweighed and an antisuit injunction should be 
issued, it is not surprising that the courts, although they have the same starting point, give different 
 
157 cf. Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 126 F.3d 365, 371-372; Laker Airways v. Sabena, 
731 F.2d 909, 937; comp. para. 18 hereinabove. 
158 cf. Bermann, p. 589 Hartley, p. 487 and 506; Schimek, p. 518 and 520. Some scholars therefore submit 
that an antisuit injunction should only be issued after the foreign court itself has dismissed an objections 
to the foreign court’s jurisdiction that the party that requests an antisuit injunction may be expected to 
raise in the foreign court (cf. Baer, p. 168 and 178-179; Bell, p. 208; Bermann, 603 and 622; comp. Asset 
Allocation and Management v. Western Employers Insurance Company, 566, 573). 
159 cf. para. 9 hereinabove. 
160 cf. Gau Shan v. Bankers Trust, 956 F.2d 1349, 1354; Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 933; non-
enforcement of a foreign judgment would for instance go less far than enjoining the foreign proceeding (cf. 
Bermann, 603), but may be less effective. 
161 cf. Philipps, p. 2024. 
162 cf. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 937; comp. para. 20 hereinabove. 
163 cf. Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems, 369 F.3d 645, 652 , China Trade v. M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33, 
36; Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 855; Philp v. Macri, 269 
F.2d 945, 947; Farrell Lines Incorporated v. Columbus Cello-Polly Corporation, 32 F.Supp.2d 118, 129; 
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answers when it comes to the question in which cases comity is actually outweighed. That is, they are 
divided as to which of the several "equitable factors" 164 that are suggested as tie-breakers are 
appropriate to examine whether an antisuit injunction stands the test of comity in the particular case.165, 
166 These equitable factors are:167 
(i) Frustration of an important public policy of the domestic forum; 
(ii) Threat to the domestic court’s jurisdiction; 
(iii) Fact that a foreign action is vexatious or oppressive; 
(iv) Delay, inconvenience, expense, inconsistency or a race to judgment; 
(v) Prejudice to other equitable considerations. 
 
36. As already described and denoted by authorities and scholars,168 two approaches were 
developed by the courts when it comes to the question which of these equitable factors are appropriate 
tie-breakers: A liberal and a restrictive approach. These approaches are insofar comparable as (i) the 
jurisdiction of the foreign forum is in general not examined,169 (ii) and an antisuit injunction may only be 
issued under both of them if a decision in the domestic proceeding will dispose of the foreign 
 
Smoothline Ltd. and Greatsino Electronic Ltd. v. North American Foreign Trading Corp., 2002 WL 
273301, 6; In re Laitasalo, 196 B.R. 913, 920; American Jurisprudence 2d, Injunctions § 195. 
164 cf. China Trade v. M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33. 
165 cf. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357, 366; Stonington 
Partners, Inc. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products, N.V., 310 F.3d 118, 129; Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles 
Corporation, 76 F.3d 624, 627; Gau Shan v. Bankers Trust, 956 F.2d 1349, 1352-1353; China Trade v. 
M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33; Umbro International Inc. v. Japan Professional Football League, 1997 WL 
33378853 1,2; Chavier, p. 267; American Jurisprudence 2d, Injunctions § 185.  
166 These factors concern factual issues, so that the review of a Court of Appeals is limited to an assessment 
whether a District Court abused its discretion when issuing an antisuit injunction (cf. Paramedics v. GE 
Medical Systems, 369 F.3d 645, 652; Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corporation, 76 F.3d 624, 627; United 
Offshore Company v. Southern Deepwater Pipeline Company, 899 F.2d 405, 407). 
167 cf. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 927; Smoothline Ltd. and Greatsino Electronic Ltd. v. North 
American Foreign Trading Corp., 2002 WL 273301, 6. 
168 comp. Mutual Service Insurance v. Frit Industries, Inc., 805 F.Supp. 919, 921; Burck, p. 481-484; 
Najarian, p. 963; Philipps, p. 2007; Salava, p. 267-268; Swanson, p. 12. 
169 Comp. for instance Northern Californian Power Agency v. Grace Geothermal Corp., 469 U.S. 1306; NBA 
v. Minnesota Professional Basketball Ltd., 56 F.3d 866; U.S. v. Rural Elec. Convenience Co-op. Co., 922 
F.2d 429; China Trade v. M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33. An exception is Laker Airways (cf. Laker Airways v. 
Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 915, 921 and 926). 
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proceeding,170 i.e. if the same parties and issues are involved.171, 172 If the parties are not identical, it 
must be assessed whether there are sufficiently similar to treat them as identical.173 If the issues only 
partially overlap, no injunction, or only a limited injunction, should be granted.174 The domestic 
proceeding is, however, not dispositive of the foreign proceeding, even if these conditions are met, 
when the domestic judgment will not be recognized in the foreign court, so that in such a case an 
antisuit injunction should not be issued.175 
B. Liberal Approach 
 
37. Under this approach, the existence of any of the above equitable factors is a sufficient basis to 
issue an antisuit injunction.176 By doing so, the courts following this approach consider judicial 
economy, inconvenience, delay or additional expenses caused by the foreign action to be adequate 
reasons to enjoin a foreign proceeding.177, 178 These concerns are potentially present in any concurrent 
litigation. Consequently, the courts following this approach consider comity to be outweighed easily. 
Indeed, the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit submits that comity "is a purely theoretical 
 
170 cf. China Trade v. M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33, 36; Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey 
League, 652 F.2d 852, 856; Perry, p. 125; comp. Baer, p. 158. 
171 comp. fn. 68 hereinabove. 
172 In other words, an antisuit injunction can only be issued if there is an American forum (cf. Bermann, p. 
626; Hartley, p. 496). 
173 For this assessment, the affiliation between the different entities and whether the claims against the 
different entities arise out of the same facts and circumstances must be taken into account (cf. 
Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems, 369 F.3d 645, 652). According to another authority it is sufficient that 
the interests of the parties in both proceedings are identical (cf. Motorola Credit Corporation v. Uzan, 
2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 111 1, 6). 
174 comp. Baer, p. 176. 
175 cf. Raushenbush, p. 1054; comp. Baer, p. 176. 
176 cf. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357, 366; Kaepa, 
Inc. v. Achilles Corporation, 76 F.3d 624, 627; Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey 
League, 652 F.2d 852, 856, where the court held that not only an identical claim in a second forum but 
also a (compulsory) counterclaim may trigger an antisuit injunction based on the criterion of vexatious 
litigation; Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495; in re Unterwasser Reederei GmbH, 428 F.2d 888, 895; 
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 430-431 also seems to tend towards the 
liberal approach; the same is true for Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Research Corp., 518 F.Supp 946, 955-
956, aff’d., 664 F.2d 660. 
177 cf. Swanson, p. 24 and 33; comp. Perry, p. 147; Sherman, p. 925; Werner, p. 1046 and 1052-1053. 
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concern",179 and precludes antisuit injunctions only when a judicial act threatens the relations between 
the United States and the foreign sovereign,180 or, put it more descriptively, if an antisuit injunction 
would "throw a monkey wrench into the foreign relations of the U.S" in the particular case.181 So, at 
least in some of the cases that were decided under this approach, comity is only taken into account 
when the foreign sovereign actually considers itself to be restricted in exercising its judicial functions by 
an antisuit injunction and notifies the American court thereof. So, comity is taken into account in a 
retroactive way only - after the decision, but not for the decision. An impairment of comity may thus be 
cured, but is not prevented: The damage to comity will already be done, when a foreign sovereign 
actually invokes that an antisuit injunction endangers its sovereignty. 
 
C. Restrictive Approach 
 
a) Introduction 
 
38. The starting point of the more restrictive approach, which is followed in several circuits182 and  
endorsed by several scholars,183 is the proposition that goals aimed at by comity are endangered by 
any antisuit injunction because such an injunction shows that the foreign court is not thought to be able 
to adjudicate a dispute fairly and efficiently, e.g. to dismiss an action when it was only filed to harass 
 
178 That is they apply basically the same reasoning in the international context as they do when they decide 
whether to enjoin another domestic proceeding (cf. Swanson, p. 24; comp. Bermann, p. 595). 
179 cf. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 432-433. 
180 Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corporation, 76 F.3d 624, 627; Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 
F.3d 425, 431, requiring an intervention by an American or French agency; and Philips Medical Systems 
International, B.V. v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 605. 
181 Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. V. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431. 
182 cf. Gau Shan v. Bankers Trust, 956 F.2d 1349, 1355; cf. Sea Containers Ltd. v. Stena AB, 890 F.2d 1205, 
1214; China Trade v. M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33, 36; Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance 
Company of North America, 651 F.2d 877, 887; Canadian Filters v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 579 
(Salava, p. 267, Perry, p. 126 and Robertson, p. 422 consider the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to 
follow the liberal approach. However, given the outcome of this case and the implied statement that 
inconvenience is not a sufficient ground to enjoin a foreign litigation (cf. idem, 579), this opinion is 
questionable; comp. Swanson, p. 12); Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 927, leaving open the 
possibility of enjoining multiple suits brought for the sole purpose of harassment; cf. idem at 928 (fn. 57); 
Mutual Service Insurance v. Frit Industries, Inc., 805 F.Supp. 919, 923, aff’d, 3 F.3d 442; American 
Jurisprudence 2d, Injunctions § 195. 
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the other party.184 Such a statement hardly encourages international relations, as the domestic court 
would in effect, according to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, express that the American 
court thinks it necessary to assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system 
of another sovereign.185, 186 Further to holding that it is per se undesirable that antisuit injunctions are 
too readily issued, the courts following the restrictive approach fear retaliation against American judicial 
decisions if the liberal approach is applied.187, 188 
39. Under the restrictive approach, comity is therefore held high and antisuit injunctions should only 
be issued in case there are the most compelling reasons to do so.189 The restrictive approach thus 
expresses that comity in general requires a court to accept a concurrent in personam proceeding,190 
and that the mere duplication of proceedings and a possible race to judgment do not allow to enjoin a 
foreign litigation, since these factors are present in every concurrent litigation.191 
b) Protection of Jurisdiction 
 
40. Saying that concurrent proceedings are, in general, admissible, encompasses the admissibility 
of the foreign and the domestic proceeding. The courts following this approach therefore expect, 
because they generally do not interfere with a foreign proceeding themselves, that foreign courts act 
alike. So, whereas the effects of an antisuit injunction on the jurisdiction of the foreign forum trigger 
 
183 cf. Anderson, p. 232; Baer, p. 168; Najarian, p. 984; Raushenbush, p. 1067-1068; Salava, p. 270; 
Schimek, p. 508; contra: Perry, p. 144-145. 
184 cf. Gau Shan v. Bankers Trust, 956 F.2d 1349, 1355; Burck, p. 488; Salava, p. 269; Schimek, p. 521. 
185 cf. Chesley v. Union Carbide Corporation, 927 F.2d 60, 66; Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-485; 
Lenenbach, p. 265. 
186 This would also conflict with the "accepted American policy on the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments, which presumes that foreign courts are fair" (cf. Baer, p. 172).  
187 cf. Gau Shan v. Bankers Trust, 956 F.2d 1349, 1355; Baer, p. 165; Maier, p. 304; Salava, p. 269; 
Schimek, p. 505. 
188 Kerwin, p. 934 however invokes that the restrictive approach does not adequately protect defendants from 
vexatious litigation. 
189 cf. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 927; Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance 
Company of North America, 651 F.2d 877, 887, Laker Airways v. Pan American World Airways, 559 
F.Supp. 1124, 1136-1138. 
190 cf. China Trade v. M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33, 36; Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 926-927 and 
938-939; Farrell Lines Incorporated v. Columbus Cello-Polly Corporation, 32 F.Supp.2d 118, 131. 
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concerns of comity, these concerns cannot prevail if the jurisdiction of the domestic forum is 
endangered by the foreign forum, that is when the foreign forum does not recognize that concurrent 
proceedings are in general admissible and thus endangers the domestic proceeding and violates the 
principle of comity itself. Also under the restrictive approach, an antisuit injunction may therefore be 
issued in such a case, i.e. if this is necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the domestic forum. This is in 
particular justified when a foreign forum seeks to "carve out exclusive jurisdiction" as e.g. by issuing an 
antisuit injunction enjoining the prosecution of an action before the domestic forum.192, 193, 194, 195 
Moreover, the admissibility of concurrent litigations is restricted to cases, where the litigations are 
actually concurrent. When a judgment is rendered in the domestic court and can be plead as res 
iudicata in the foreign forum, the foreign litigation can be enjoined to protect and earlier judgment of the 
domestic court and to prevent vexatious re-litigation.196 Laker Airways and China Trade do not mention 
whether the res-iudicata effect of the domestic judgment in the foreign court must be assessed based 
on domestic or foreign law. An earlier Supreme Court decision however suggests that foreign law must 
be applied to this question.197 This entails that not all American judgments qualify to be protected by an 
antisuit injunction. In particular, recognition and enforcement of an American judgment cannot be 
expected offhandedly, if an American court bases its jurisdiction on one of the long-arm statutes. 
41. Moreover, the admissibility of concurrent foreign proceedings is, according to case law, limited 
to in personam proceedings. Concurrent proceedings in rem or quasi in rem may therefore be enjoined 
 
191 cf. Stonington Partners, Inc. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products, N.V., 310 F.3d 118, 127; Laker 
Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 928-929. 
192 cf. Gau Shan v. Bankers Trust, 956 F.2d 1349, 1356; China Trade v. M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33, 36-37; 
Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 927 and 929-930. 
193 In Umbro International, Inc. v. Japanese Professional Football League, 1997 WL 33378853 1, 3 the fact 
that the Japanese rules of procedures did not contain sufficient confidentiality protections was deemed to 
"render this Court’s protection of the parties meaningless", which justified issuing an antisuit injunction. 
194 A court’s jurisdiction is not threatened by the possibility that a ruling of a foreign court might eventually 
result in the voluntary dismissal of the action before the domestic court (cf. Gau Shan v. Bankers Trust, 
956 F.2d 1349, 1356). 
195 According to Laker Airways v. Sabena, an attempt of a foreign forum to carve out exclusive jurisdiction is 
also constitutes a violation of public policy (cf. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 939. 
196 cf. China Trade v. M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33, 36; Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 926-928 and 
938-939; Farrell Lines Incorporated v. Columbus Cello-Polly Corporation, 32 F.Supp.2d 118, 131.  
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when the concept of res iudicata alone does not protect the jurisdiction of the domestic court.198 The 
reason for this approach is that the foreign proceeding endangers the domestic jurisdiction in such a 
case because it might lead to the transfer of the property to the territory of the foreign forum thus 
depriving the domestic court of its basis for jurisdiction - the existence of the res in the domestic 
forum.199 
42. If one of above described cases is established, an antisuit injunction may be issued. In these 
cases, issuing an antisuit injunction may be described as a defensive measure,200 necessary for the 
"United States courts [to] control access to their forums".201 
c) Public Policy 
 
43. The second ground to enjoin a foreign proceeding under the restrictive approach is (i) that the 
foreign action was initiated to evade an important public policy of the domestic forum, and (ii) that there 
is reason to believe that the foreign court will not implement this policy.202 Seeking slight advantages in 
the substantive or procedural law of the foreign forum does, on the other hand, not suffice.203 Moreover, 
a high-level public policy must be concerned.204 This is deemed justified because already the standard 
for refusing to enforce foreign judgments on public-policy grounds is strict and an antisuit injunction is 
an even greater interference with the judicial system of the foreign forum, and thus with comity205 The 
threshold must therefore be even higher for antisuit injunctions. So, only the evasion of the most 
 
197 cf. Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230. 
198 cf. Mandevill v. Canterbury, 318 U.S. 47, 48-49; Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230; 
China Trade v. M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33, 36; Gau Shan v. Bankers Trust, 956 F.2d 1349, 1356. 
199 comp. Burck, p. 480. 
200 cf. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 915; comp. James v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad 
Company, 14 Ill.2d 356, 371-372. 
201 cf. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 936/937. 
202 cf. Hartley, p. 497; Bermann, p. 623. 
203 cf. Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems, 369 F.3d 645, 654; Gau Shan v. Bankers Trust, 956 F.2d 1349, 
1357; Sea Containers Ltd. v. Stena AB, 890 F.2d 1205, 1214 ; China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong 
Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36; Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 931-932. 
204 cf. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 930-93. 
205 cf. Gau Shan v. Bankers Trust, 956 F.2d 1349, 1355; Schimek, p. 516. 
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compelling public policies outweigh concerns of comity when it comes to issuing antisuit injunctions.206, 
207 
D. Comparison of the Two Approaches 
 
44. What distinguishes the two approaches is essentially that reasons of judicial economy or 
prevention of delays, additional expenses and inconvenience are sufficient to enjoin a foreign 
proceeding under the liberal approach. Yet it must be expected that any concurrent litigation entails 
these disadvantages, so that actually any concurrent, foreign proceeding involving the same parties 
and issues is enjoinable under the liberal approach. This does not seem compatible with comity, and 
contradicts the starting point also taken by the courts applying the liberal standard, i.e. that an antisuit 
injunction should, in order to implement comity, be issued only with restraint,208 as, in the greater 
picture, injunctive relief should be used "sparingly, and only in a clear case".209 
45. Also, the liberal approach includes factors that are more appropriately addressed in a motion to 
dismiss the domestic action based on forum non conveniens.210 However, in contrast to a decision on 
such a motion, where the court is limited to declining its own jurisdiction, a decision to enjoin a foreign 
proceeding effectively destroys the jurisdiction of the foreign forum. Given the different effects of these 
two jurisdiction-related motions, it is appropriate to decide them on different factors. A decision to 
decline the jurisdiction of the foreign forum based on the factors that are sufficient only under the liberal 
approach should therefore be made by the foreign forum,211 and arguments of vexatiousness and the 
like should only be addressed by the domestic court for a decision on a motion to dismiss based on 
 
206 cf. idem, p. 1358. 
207 On an international level, the public policy of a state deserve less weight than those of the nation (cf. Gau 
Shan v. Bankers Trust, 956 F.2d 1349, 1358. In this case, the availability of treble damages under 
Tennessee law was not held to be a public policy so important that it would justify an antisuit injunction). 
208 cf. Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 855. 
209 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378. 
210 comp. para. 10 hereinabove. 
211 Baer, p. 172-174; comp. the dissenting opinion in Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corporation, 76 F.3d 624, 632; 
Raushenbush, p. 1050. 
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forum non conveniens.212 
46. An argument submitted in support of the liberal approach is that antisuit injunctions must remain 
a viable option to ensure the integrity of a United States judgment and the interests of the United States 
litigants as long as foreign courts do not provide them with a "reasonably predictable exequatur and res 
judicata procedure".213 This reasoning does, however, not support the liberal approach as it essentially 
aims at protecting domestic judgments, which is also a reason to enjoin foreign proceedings under the 
restrictive approach.214 
47. It is also invoked that the restrictive approach does not adequately protect a party against 
vexatious litigation and that antisuit injunctions should be available when a concurrent action is filed in 
bad faith.215, 216 These are valid arguments that deserve consideration. However, they are chiefly about 
the private interests of one of the parties. Such interests can be protected by both fora. Arguing that the 
foreign forum would not sanction bad-faith behavior would run counter to the principle of comity and 
can therefore not be a ground to issue an antisuit injunction,217 unless (i) a public policy of the forum is 
violated by the foreign forum and (ii) a request to dismiss the foreign action has been dismissed by the 
foreign court. Moreover, beginning a litigation in a second forum does not amount to the degree of 
vexatiousness that is by itself considered to be a reason to enjoin a present or future litigation;218 unlike 
in these cases, the party that the applicant wants to prevent from litigating does not file several similar 
or identical suits simply to harass the applicant, but one suit in a foreign forum, which may be 
understood as a reaction to the suit of the complainant. 
 
E. Summary 
 
48. Some courts follow a liberal approach, some a restrictive approach when confronted with a 
 
212 cf. Gau Shan v. Bankers Trust, 956 F.2d 1349, 1355; Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 928. So, a 
more decisive showing of inconvenience ought to be required in the anti-suit context than in the forum-
non-conveniens context (Bermann, p. 614). 
213 cf. Perry, p. 150. 
214 comp. para. 40 hereinabove. 
215 For the latter case, see Philipps, p. 2011. 
216 cf. Kerwin, p. 934; comp. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 928 (fn. 57). 
217 comp. para. 38 hereinabove. 
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motion to enjoin a concurrent, foreign proceeding. Neither approach describes the contents of comity, 
but defines certain equitable factors in the presence of which comity is assumed to be outweighed. 
Under the liberal approach, the factors are such that any concurrent foreign proceeding can potentially 
be enjoined whereas the threshold under the restrictive approach is hard to cross. It is submitted, that, 
for the reasons mentioned in paras. 44 et seq. hereinabove, the restrictive approach better fits into the 
American legal system, in particular because the liberal approach does not adequately consider the 
existence and significance of the concept of comity. Part IV will now analyze whether this is a perfect fit, 
or whether certain adjustments are appropriate. 
 
IV. MAKING AN ALTERNATIVE PICTURE 
 
A. Inter-Sovereign Test 
 
49. There is no international treaty or customary international law, that would prevent an American 
court from enjoining foreign proceedings.219 Rather it is chiefly the domestic principle of comity that 
counsels restraint. While the restrictive approach takes comity into account, some decisions under this 
approach raise the concern that it should be applied with more formalistic accuracy in order to embed 
the restrictive approach more precisely into American law: The equitable factors used as tie-breakers 
for the comity-test, protection of the jurisdiction of the court or of an important public policy of the forum, 
do, firsthand, protect the integrity of the domestic judicial system itself and only secondhand the 
complainant,; the domestic court wants its jurisdiction to be protected and its public policy to be 
respected.220 Of course the applicant pursues his own interests by invoking that the jurisdiction of the 
domestic forum must be protected: He intends to escape the inconvenience of participating in a foreign 
litigation or an unfavorable law there applicable. This kind of inconvenience itself does, however, not 
suffice to issue an antisuit injunction under the restrictive approach, so that it should not be considered, 
when examining whose interests are protected by issuing an antisuit injunction by these two equitable 
 
218 comp. para. 3(i) hereinabove. 
219 cf. Lenenbach, p. 294. Given the long tradition of the common law countries, a custom precluding antisuit 
injunctions can hardly be assumed (cf. idem). 
220 comp. fn. 64 hereinabove. 
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factors, the protection of the jurisdiction or of the public policy of the forum. It follows that the restrictive 
approach highlights the interests of the judicial system of the forum, but does not expressly refer to the 
interests of the parties. 
50. Considering the interests of the two judicial systems that are involved is of course appropriate to 
assess whether comity is outweighed as described in paras. 38 et seq. hereinabove. On the other 
hand, as for any injunction, the concerns of the parties should be considered: Antisuit injunctions are a 
subspecies of equitable relief, which aims to establish fairness in the particular case,221 which cannot 
be done without also addressing the interests of the parties. So, it is suggested to apply a two-step test 
when a motion to enjoin a foreign litigation is filed, the first step being an inter-sovereign test, by 
examining whether comity is outweighed, the second step being an inter-parties test, examining 
whether the interests of the applicant are such that they merit an antisuit injunction.222 
B. Inter-Parties Test 
 
51. It is submitted that the inter-parties test should be performed like the regular test for 
injunctions.223 This is not regularly done,224 but in line with several authorities.225 This brings antisuit 
 
221 comp. para. 14 hereinabove. 
222 An interesting proposal suggests to not always apply forum law to decide whether an antisuit injunction 
should be issued, but to take comity into account by determining, based on conflict-of-laws principles, the 
equities of which country should decide whether an antisuit injunction should be issued (comp. Kerwin, p. 
940 et seq.). The fact that principles of equity and antisuit injunctions are not available in all jurisdictions 
makes this approach hard to implement and would for the same posture lead to different results 
depending on what foreign sovereign is involved if foreign equity is applicable; moreover, it seems prima 
facie justified to assume that whether a court should issue an antisuit injunction is - like its opposite, a 
stay or dismissal of the action - a procedural question to which forum law should apply. 
223 cf. Chavier, p. 262-263; comp. Sherman, p. 927. According to Stonington Partners, Inc. v. Lernout & 
Hauspie Speech Products, N.V., 310 F.3d 118, 129, the criteria of protection-of-jurisdiction and public-
policy are more restrictive than the general requirements for injunctions. This is, however, no reason not 
to check whether these general requirements are actually satisfied.  
224 comp. Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems, 369 F.3d 645, 652; Computer Associates International, Inc. v. 
Altai, Inc. 126 F.3d 365, 372; China Trade v. M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33. Neither were these criteria 
considered by the District Court which decided on the motion in the latter case and whose decision was 
overturned on appeal (cf. China Trade and Development Corp. v. M.V. Chong Yong, 1987 WL 13732; 
comp. also Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Columbus Cello-Poly, Corp. 32 F.Supp.2d 118; Smoothline, Ltd. v. North 
American Foreign Trading Corp., 2002 WL 273301 1,6). In a decision of a District Court in the Second 
Circuit rendered after China Trade, the criteria of irreparable harm and likelihood of success were 
however referred to (cf. International Fashion Products, B.V. v. Calvin Klein, Inc., 1995 WL 92321 1).  
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injunctions in line with other injunctions while considering the peculiarities of antisuit injunctions, i.e. that 
they have jurisdictional aspects and that therefore the interests of the domestic and the foreign 
sovereign themselves are involved, by the inter-sovereign test, and it allows to consider some of the 
concerns raised by doctrine. For instance, several scholars submit that the applicant should first try to 
stop the proceeding in the foreign court before applying for an antisuit injunction in the domestic 
court,226 in order to ensure that a foreign proceeding is only interfered with if necessary. This concern is 
implemented by only issuing antisuit injunctions if the harm is not merely speculative, which is one of 
the conditions for regular injunctive relief.227 
52. An adequate remedy-at-law exists when the foreign forum provides a legal instrument to 
achieve the result the applicant seeks to achieve with the antisuit injunction in the domestic forum. A 
remedy that might for instance exclude an antisuit injunction is the availability of a defense of lis 
pendens in the foreign forum.228 
53. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit submits that the criterion of likelihood of success,229 
when an antisuit injunction enjoining a concurrent foreign proceeding is sought, has no meaning 
independent of whether the applicant has "demonstrated that the factors specific to an antisuit 
 
225 cf. e.g. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357, 366; Casa 
Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico For Dist. Of Arecibo, 988 F.2d 252, 263; U.S. v. Rural Elec. 
Convenience Co-op. Co., 922 F.2d 429, 438-439; Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. Robhal, Inc., 961 F.Supp. 
822, 829; United Offshore Company v. Southern Deepwater Pipeline Company, 899 F.2d 405, 408; 
American Horse Protection Association v. Lyng, 690 F. Supp. 40, 42; National Trust Company v. 
American Home Assurance Company, 1987 WL 5837 1, 5. In an earlier decision the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit had however pointed out that the general criteria are of secondary nature and that the 
primary factor for the decision whether to grant an antisuit injunction is the convenience of the parties and 
the courts (cf. Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security National Bank, 525 F.2d 620). According to the Supreme 
Court, it must be established that no adequate remedy at law exists and that the applicant faces 
irreparable harm (cf. Northern Californian Power Agency v. Grace Geothermal Corp., 469 U.S. 1306, 
1306-1307). 
226 comp. Baer, p. 168 and 178-179; Bell, p. 208; Bermann, p. 603 and 622. For instance based on the 
concepts of estoppel, waiver, lis pendens, res iudicata or forum non conveniens. comp. Asset Allocation 
and Management v. Western Employers Insurance Company, 566, 573). 
227 cf. Energy Capital v. Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corporation, 1996 WL 157498 1, 10; American 
Jurisprudence 2d, Injunctions § 33; comp. Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico For Dist. of 
Arecibo, 988 F.2d 252, 263. 
228 cf. Northern Californian Power Agency v. Grace Geothermal Corp., 469 U.S. 1306.  
229 For permanent injunctions success must be established (comp. fn. 53 hereinabove) . 
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injunction weigh in favor of granting that injunction".230 The Court of Appeals for the Federal District 
agrees that the criterion of success on the merits does "not apply" to motions to enjoin the prosecution 
of concurrent litigation, but that "[i]nstead" it must be examined whether the issues and the parties are 
such that the disposition of one case would be dispositive of the other.231, 232 It is submitted here, that 
antisuit injunctions concern, at the end of the day, jurisdictional issues.233 Therefore, the merits of the 
case cannot be pertinent for the assessment whether the "merits" of the request for an antisuit 
injunction are established: The question thus remains what "success on the merits" relates to for an 
antisuit injunction. In line with other injunctions, the object of the injunction must be pertinent. If e.g. an 
order for specific performance of a contract is applied for, the contractual right on which the application 
is based must be established. Here, the object is whether the parties shall be restricted from access to 
a foreign court. The application for an antisuit injunction must in other words pass the inter-sovereign 
test. What the existence of a contractual right is for an injunction ordering the specific performance of 
the contract, is the comity threshold for an international antisuit injunction. Without a showing that the 
applicant has satisfied this condition, no antisuit injunction will be issued, irrespective of whether the 
court follows the liberal or the restrictive approach. The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit is therefore convincing. It is appropriate to include the comity threshold in the test whether 
success on the merits is established. Depending on whether preliminary or permanent relief is sought, 
 
230 cf. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357, 362; 
International Fashion Products, B.V. v. Calvin Klein, Inc., 1995 WL 92321 1,2.  
231 cf. Katz v. Lear Siegler, 909 F.2d 1459, 1463; China Trade v. M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33, 36; Victor v. 
Ortho Organizers, Inc., 932 F.Supp. 261, 263; Smoothline Ltd. and Greatsino Electronic Ltd. v. North 
American Foreign Trading Corp., 2002 WL 273301, 6; Baer, p. 175-176. In Laker Airways v. Pan 
American World Airways, 559 F.Supp. 1124, 1129 the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia pointed out that it had to examine whether there was likelihood of success on the merits of 
the"permanent injunction … and the relative balance of injuries and the public interest". The court held 
that "it is likely that plaintiff will prevail on the merits of its request for a permanent injunction" (cf. idem at 
1136); exactly what part of its reasoning lead to this conclusion is not determinable. The decision was 
upheld on appeal, however without addressing the individual prerequisites for issuing an injunction (cf. 
Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909). 
232 comp. para. 36 hereinabove. 
233 comp. para. 5 hereinabove. 
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a showing of likelihood of success or of actual success is necessary.234 
54. The requirement of irreparable harm is the adequate place to examine whether one of the 
equitable criteria mentioned in para. 34(iii) to (v) is satisfied. Concurrent proceedings entail that the 
plaintiff is forced to litigate in two sovereigns, possibly is subject to inconsistent rulings and faces 
additional expenses and delays.235 This is an inconvenience that must generally be considered to 
constitute irreparable harm. What constitutes harm is thus the result of the duplication of the action, i.e. 
that the foreign and the domestic forum essentially deal with the same issues. If they do not, there are 
no additional expenses, no race to judgment etc. So, an antisuit injunction should only be issued if the 
domestic action is dispositive of the foreign action. Disposition should however not be narrowed to 
actions between the same parties and concerning the same issues. If the domestic action concerns an 
issue that is a preliminary issue in the foreign proceeding, this should be s encompassed under this 
heading as well.236 Moreover, the harm must be irreparable, and as long as a motion to dismiss the 
foreign action is not dismissed in the foreign court, an assertion of irreparable harm is merely 
speculative, and an antisuit injunction should not be issued.237, 238 If the foreign court dismisses an 
objection to its jurisdiction, factors like the possibility to recover damages and attorneys’ fees may be 
taken into account when examining whether the foreign action actually constitutes irreparable harm.  
55. In a last step, the public and private interests, which are supported and impaired by an antisuit 
 
234 comp. fn. 53 hereinabove. 
235 cf. American Horse Protection v. Lyng, 690 F.Supp. 40, 44; International Fashion Products, B.V. v. Calvin 
Klein, Inc., 1995 WL 92321, 1. 
236 If the proceeding before the domestic court concerns an issue that is preliminary for a proceeding in the 
foreign court, it faces a dilemma when an antisuit injunction is requested before it rules on the preliminary 
issue: Supposing that it will dismiss the case, it can enjoin the foreign proceeding based on an 
(anticipatory) protection of the domestic judgment; its decision is then also dispositive of the foreign 
proceeding. Supposing that it will uphold the requests filed, its decision would not be dispositive of the 
foreign action, but be the starting point for that action. While the first possible outcome satisfies the 
comity-threshold under the restrictive approach, the second does not. It is submitted here, however, that a 
court which faces such a case can in fact enjoin the domestic proceeding as the two actions are not truly 
concurrent, but in order. Moreover, a later protection of the domestic judgment might otherwise be 
precluded. 
237 comp. Energy Capital v. Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corporation, 1996 WL 157498 1, 10. 
238 The harm that is caused by a second litigation - additional cost, delay etc. - is under the restrictive 
approach, which is the basis of the analysis under Title IV not a harm that qualifies as irreparable harm. 
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injunction must be weighed. As to the public interests of the foreign forum, it is submitted that they 
presumably do not outweigh those of the domestic forum if the comity threshold is taken under the 
restrictive approach.239 When assessing the balance of private interests, it must be examined whether 
the proceedings before the domestic or the foreign court better live up to the interests of both parties 
under the equitable factors listed in para. 35(iii) - (iv),240 which analysis is akin to that to be done when a 
motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens is filed,241 and which leaves some room for 
discretion to the domestic court.242 Indeed, like for regular injunctions, it is in the discretion of the court 
to grant antisuit injunctions.243 Further to the equitable factors mentioned hereinabove, the court might 
also take into account where the award will be enforced and whether its award and/or that of the foreign 
forum can be enforced there. To perform this balancing test, some courts seem to take the available 
remedies and thus the substantive law into account.244 Here, it is submitted, that this should be 
avoided. Of course, a public policy of the forum may be considered to establish whether the comity 
threshold is taken. However, this is to ensure that cases that allegedly concern an important public 
policy of the forum are not dragged into a foreign forum. But the court should not go further and look 
behind the curtain when it comes to a balancing of the interests of the parties. For the balancing test, 
also the timing of the concurrent proceedings may be considered: An antisuit injunction may be more 
 
239 However, if both in the foreign and in the domestic forum public policy concerns are involved, requiring 
the parties to bring suit in the respective forum, it would be adequate, but difficult to weigh the policies of 
both for a cf. Faberge International, Inc. v. Di Pino, 109 A.D.2d 235, 240), whereas a forum can hardly be 
blamed for implementing its own public policy as a tie-breaker. Comp., e.g., Laker Airways v. Pan 
American, in which case antitrust issues were dealt with in both fora, and where the court of first instance 
held that, since antitrust issues affecting the American market were involved, there was a strong public 
interest in having the action decided in the United States (cf. Laker Airways v. Pan American World 
Airways, 559 F.Supp. 1124, 1138). 
240 cf. Allendale Mutual Insurance Company v. Bull Data, Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 430; International Fashion 
Products, B.V. v. Calvin Klein, Inc., 1995 WL 92321 1,2; Baer, p. 176-178. 
241 However, the plaintiff’s choice of forum cannot have any impact on this decision as proceedings were 
initiated by both parties in the different fora.
242 In particular it is not, according to these equitable factors, decisive which action was brought first (cf. 
Columbia Plaza Corporation v. Security National Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 627). 
243 cf. Philp v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945, 947. 
244 In Laker Airways v. Pan American World Airways, 559 F.Supp. 1124, the court examined what remedies 
are available under British and American law in order to determine in whose favor the balance-of-
inconvenience test tips.  
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appropriate when the action was brought first in the domestic forum,245 in particular when substantial 
time has elapsed between the commencement of the two actions.246 
245 cf. Victor v. Ortho Organizers, Inc., 932 F.Supp. 261, 263. 
246 cf. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 929. 
40 
C. Summary 
 
56. The Karaha Bodas court pointed out that "the suitability of such relief ultimately depends on 
considerations unique to antisuit injunctions",247 and did not express itself as to the "extent the 
traditional preliminary injunction test is appropriate".248 The approach described in paras. 49 et seq. 
hereinabove considers the uniqueness of antisuit injunctions in the inter-sovereign test, which is 
performed on the standards of the restrictive approach. And the inter-parties test has the benefit that 
conditions that were developed to decide whether an antisuit injunction should be issued, like the one 
that the domestic action must be dispositive of the foreign action, are integrated into an already existing 
pattern. 
57. The two-step test here suggested thus aims to highlight the system in which antisuit injunctions 
are embedded and to reflect the peculiarity of antisuit injunctions, that they protect the interests of one 
of the parties, like other injunctions, and at the same time those of the domestic forum itself - the 
protection of its jurisdiction and public policy. It also harmonizes antisuit injunctions with regular 
injunctions by examining whether the regular conditions for injunctions are satisfied in the second step 
of the test. Moreover, while recognizing that American law allows to issue antisuit injunctions, this test, 
by its first step, implements the proposition that antisuit injunctions should be issued with more restraint 
than ordinary injunctions by imposing extra-conditions,249 and only in sparingly and "in very special 
circumstances".250 Also, this approach takes into considerations that the effects of an antisuit injunction 
exceed those of a decision that the domestic forum is non conveniens, as the latter does not affect a 
foreign sovereign, i.e. by applying a higher standard for the first case, this approach puts these two 
 
247 That is, a court is required to balance domestic judiical interests against concerns of international comity 
(Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357, 366). The 
interests of two judicial  
248 cf. idem, p. 364. 
249 comp. Philipps, p. 2011.  
250 cf. Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems, 369 F.3d 645, 652 , China Trade v. M.V. Choong, 837 F.2d 33, 
36; Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 855; Philp v. Macri, 269 
F.2d 945, 947; Farrell Lines Incorporated v. Columbus Cello-Polly Corporation, 32 F.Supp.2d 118, 129; 
Smoothline Ltd. and Greatsino Electronic Ltd. v. North American Foreign Trading Corp., 2002 WL 
273301, 6; In re Laitasalo, 196 B.R. 913, 920; American Jurisprudence 2d, Injunctions, § 195. 
41 
tools into proper proportion. Moreover, this approach also considers that comity concerns are more 
compelling in a international than in a domestic context,251 as is not to be expected that antisuit 
injunctions are more readily available under this approach than under the Antisuit Injunction Act. The 
main difference between the restrictive approach and the approach here submitted is that it is 
suggested to include a quasi forum-non-conveniens test. 
 
V. ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
 
A. Introduction 
 
58. This paper has so far dealt with concurrent litigations. This part will analyze whether, and if so 
under what conditions, antisuit injunctions may be issued by an American court in the context of 
international arbitrations. Be it that the American court is requested to enjoin (i) a foreign litigation to 
protect an arbitration, which is concurrent to the foreign litigation, as in Paramedics,252 or (ii) an 
arbitration, which is concurrent to a domestic litigation, as in Uzan.253 Moreover, it will be examined 
whether a court can enjoin a party from seeking enforcement of an arbitration award in a foreign forum. 
59. A fourth alternative, which is not further addressed hereinafter because it was convincingly 
addressed in Karaha Bodas,254 is that an American court is at the same time requested to enforce a 
foreign arbitral award and to enjoin a foreign set-aside proceeding. The court examined the availability 
of such an injunction based on the New York Convention255 and concluded that a foreign set-aside 
proceeding (i) does not interfere with a domestic enforcement proceeding because the Convention 
separates the roles of the courts of the country of origin on the one hand, and on those in all other 
countries on the other hand, which are limited to decide on the enforcement of the award,256 and that (ii) 
 
251 cf. Sea Containers Ltd. v. Stena AB, 890 F.2d 1205, 1213; contra: Allendale Mutual Insurance Company 
v. Bull Data, Inc., 10 aF.3d 425, 431; Mutual Service Insurance v. Frit Industries, Inc., 805 F.Supp. 919, 
923. 
252 cf. Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems, 369 F.3d 645 
253 cf. Motorola Credit Corporation v. Uzan, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19632, 9-12. 
254 cf. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357. 
255 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 
1958 (the "Convention”). 
256 cf. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357, 372-373. 
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it therefore does not attack the jurisdiction of the enforcement court. An antisuit injunction as requested 
by the party that prevailed in the arbitration would therefore be at odds with the system created by the 
Convention. The approach taken in Karaha Bodas, keeping the tasks of the different countries apart, 
which are to some degree involved in the arbitration, will also provide a starting point to address the 
other postures described in para. 58 hereinabove. 
 
B. Antisuit Injunctions in Support of Arbitration Proceedings 
 
a) Introduction 
 
60. A situation may arise where one party brings suit in a foreign forum, while the other party wants 
to arbitrate the dispute.257 The latter party might file a motion to compel arbitration based on section 206 
of the Federal Arbitration Act258 combined with a motion to enjoin the foreign litigation, which was 
allegedly initiated in violation of an arbitration agreement. While the Convention as implemented by the 
Federal Arbitration Act provides that the first motion must be granted259 if arbitrability is established,260 it 
is silent as to the second motion. So, should a domestic court, if it is of the opinion that the parties must 
arbitrate their dispute, guard its order to compel arbitration with an injunction enjoining the foreign 
litigation?261 This would, prima facie, implement the directions of the Convention to refer the parties to 
arbitration if there is an arbitration agreement and might be the only way to ensure that the parties will 
actually arbitrate the dispute. 
 
b) Forum-Selection Clauses 
 
61. Like arbitration agreements, forum-selection clauses contractually determine the jurisdiction for 
 
257 Although this paper focuses on foreign litigations, it is mentioned for the sake of completeness, that 
federal courts have the authority to grant an injunction to stay state court proceedings in aid of an order to 
compel arbitration thus implementing the federal policy favoring arbitration expressed in the Federal 
Arbitration Act (cf. Central Reserve Life Insurance v. Marello, 2001 WL 41129 1,2). 
258 9 U.S.C. 
259 Other signatories interpret the phrase "refer to arbitration" to be limited to an obligation of the courts to 
stay proceedings before them if an arbitration agreement is invoked, but not an obligation to compel 
arbitration as provided for in section 206 of the Federal Arbitration Act (cf. van den Berg, p. 129; Born, p. 
296; Weigand, N 44 to Part 1). 
260 cf. Art. II(3) of the Convention. 
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a defined legal relationship. Arbitration agreements are under this aspect a specialized kind of forum-
selection clauses.262 It is therefore appropriate to also consider jurisprudence and doctrine dealing with 
forum-selection clauses for the analysis mentioned in para. 58 hereinabove. The pertinent case law 
suggests that the enforcement of forum-selection clauses is a public policy allowing courts to issue 
antisuit injunctions in order to make sure that the dispute is litigated in the forum that was agreed 
upon.263, 264, 265 So, according to case law, the existence of a forum-selection clause has itself the effect 
that a foreign litigation can be enjoined, so that the domestic court can force its interpretation of 
jurisdiction on the foreign court266 without examining whether an antisuit injunction is necessary to 
protect the jurisdiction or a public policy of the forum. The existence of a forum selection clause might 
therefore outright trigger an antisuit injunction. 
62. The other side of the coin is that a court must recognize a forum-selection clause and dismiss 
the case if it is applied to in violation of a forum-selection clause unless enforcement would clearly be 
unjust and unreasonable; proceeding otherwise would reflect something of a provincial attitude 
regarding the fairness of other tribunals.267 The reason for this deference is, according to the Supreme 
Court, that the expansion of American business would hardly be encouraged if "notwithstanding solemn 
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our 
 
261 comp. fn. 58 hereinabove. 
262 cf. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519. 
263 cf. Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Columbus Cello-Poly, Corp., 32 F.Supp.2d 118, 130; International Fashion 
Products, B.V. v. Calvin Klein, Inc., 1995 WL 92321 1,2. Interestingly, the forum selection clause was not 
addressed in Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corporation, 76 F.3d 624. 
264 Also, the vindication of an obligation not to sue may justify an antisuit injunction (cf. Bermann, p. 608 and 
618-619). 
265 comp. Lenenbach, p. 285, submitting that (i) there is a strong need for the enforcement of forum-selection 
clauses, so that the non-recognition of a judgment that was rendered in violation of a forum-selection 
clause will not suffice if the judgment can be enforced in a country where the violation of the forum-
selection clause will be accepted (cf. idem, p. 285) and that (ii) when the parties have voluntarily 
submitted themselves not to sue in a foreign forum, considerations of comity are less important, and an 
antisuit injunction should be issued more readily when the foreign forum does not accept the selection of 
the domestic forum (cf. idem, p. 285-286 and 290). The basis for an antisuit injunction is then that there is 
a contractual right not to sue abroad stemming out of the forum-selection clause (cf. idem, p. 288-289). 
266 comp. Lenenbach, p. 23. 
267 cf. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore, Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-13 and 15; comp Lenenbach, p. 285. 
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courts".268 Like the concept of comity, this approach is therefore not without self-interest. 
 
c) American Jurisprudence 
 
63. The issue which is at stake here has recently been addressed in Paramedics.269 In this case, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit proceeded as follows: It (i) first determined whether the case 
before it was dispositive of the foreign litigation and, holding that it was, (ii) analyzed whether comity 
concerns were outweighed under the restrictive approach.270 According to Paramedics, the first 
condition is satisfied if the parties are substantially similar271 and the dispute is arbitrable. Then, the 
dispute is reserved to arbitration, so that the motion to compel arbitration must be granted. If so, the 
case cannot be heard by the foreign forum. Insofar the domestic decision on the motion to compel 
arbitration is considered to dispose of the foreign litigation.272 Regarding the second condition, the 
Paramedics court quoted Laker Airways273 and held that enjoining the foreign action was appropriate to 
protect the judgment compelling the parties to arbitrate.274 
64. Whether an attempt to sidestep an arbitration agreement is for itself a sufficient basis for an 
antisuit injunction was not decided in Paramedics.275 In Smoothline, an earlier decision of the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, this had been answered in the affirmative. The Smoothline 
court held that the American public policy favoring arbitration, which applies with particular force in the 
international context,276 is a sufficient basis to enjoin a foreign proceeding if it is established that the 
 
268 cf. idem, p. 9-10. 
269 cf. Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems, 369 F.3d 645.  
270 cf. idem, p. 652; Smoothline, Ltd. v. North American Foreign Trading Corp., 2002 WL 273301 1,6. 
271 cf. Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems, 369 F.3d 645, 652. So, it is sufficient that the "real part[ies] in 
interest" are bound by the arbitration agreement, so that even if a third party is named as party in the 
court proceedings arbitration can be compelled and the court proceedings be enjoined (cf. Doctor’s 
Associates, Inc. v. Hollingsworth, 949 F.Supp 77, 85), respectively that the arbitration agreement is 
binding on non-signatories (cf. in re Laitsalo 196 B.R. 913, 917-920). 
272 cf. Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems, 369 F.3d 645, 653. 
273 "There is less justification for permitting a second action after a prior court has reached a judgment on the 
same issues" (Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 928 (fn. 53)).
274 cf. Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems, 369 F.3d 645, 654. 
275 cf. idem, p. 654. The issue was left open because the court was of the opinion that an antisuit injunction 
should already be issued to protect the jurisdiction of the court. 
276 cf. idem, p. 654. 
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subject-matter should be arbitrated.277 According to case law, the mere existence of both arbitration 
agreements and forum-selection clauses may thus entail that a foreign litigation is enjoined. This may 
be explained by the fact that the enforcement of these agreements is supposed to be compatible with 
the goals of equity and necessary because their special nature makes the mere avoiding of damages 
inadequate.278 
d) Discussion 
 
aa) Introduction 
 
65. In Paramedics,279 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit limited its analysis whether or not 
to issue an antisuit injunction to a purely domestic perspective. It did neither address the Convention 
nor whether the foreign forum had already expressed its opinion on the arbitrability of the dispute, and 
the antisuit injunction was granted to implement the domestic decision to compel arbitration. Although 
the court applied the restrictive approach, whose starting point is the admissibility of concurrent 
litigation, it transpires that the starting point in Paramedics was just the other way round: That an 
arbitral tribunal and a court cannot have concurrent jurisdiction,280 and not that concurrent proceedings 
are in general admissible.281 So, the finding of the Paramedics court that there was an agreement to 
arbitrate the dispute which was pending in the foreign proceeding pushed the applicant over the comity-
threshold. This is consistent with the opinion expressed by one line of doctrine, which holds that comity 
weighs less heavily if the parties entered into an agreement to regulate the jurisdiction of their possible 
disputes.282 
277 cf. Smoothline, Ltd. v. North American Foreign Trading Corp., 2002 WL 273301 1,6. In a subsequent 
decision of the same court, the same question was, however, impliedly answered in the negative: Since 
an arbitration between the parties was already pending, no order to compel arbitration could be issued, so 
that an antisuit injunction to guard such an order was not available either (cf. Laif X v. Axtel, S.A., 310 
F.Supp.2d 578, 581). In the latter case, the existence of an arbitration agreement thus did not lead to an 
antisuit injunction. 
278 comp. para. 17 hereinabove. 
279 cf. Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems, 369 F.3d 645. 
280 cf. General Electric v. Deutz AG, 129 F.Supp.2d 776, 788. 
281 comp. para. 33 hereinabove. 
282 cf. Bermann, p. 623; Lenenbach, p. 290.  
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66. The following discussion tries to examine whether the approach and the outcome of Paramedics 
are convincing. In particular, it will be examined (i) whether Convention has an impact on the solution of 
this kind of cases, and (ii) whether the significance that the contractual nature of the arbitration 
agreement is given283 is appropriate. 
 
bb) Impact of the Convention 
 
67. The Convention was incorporated into American law as the second chapter of the Federal 
Arbitration Act.284 Further to provisions on the enforcement of arbitral awards, the Convention also 
contains provisions on the relationship between domestic litigations and international arbitrations, in 
particular in Art. II(3), according to which provision the parties must be referred to arbitration under 
certain conditions. So, an analysis of whether antisuit injunctions may be issued in support of 
arbitrations would not be complete without taking the Convention into account. 
68. The Convention does neither expressly limits nor recognizes the authority of a federal court to 
issue antisuit injunctions.285 Also, that India was the only nation which signed the Convention in 1958 
and whose courts issue antisuit injunctions does not per se entail that the signatories meant, absent a 
provision allowing such injunctions, to exclude their issuance. It must rather be assumed that antisuit 
injunctions were not an issue when negotiating the Convention. It must therefore be established 
whether the spirit and the features of the Convention have an impact on the issue at stake. The mere 
absence of express wording itself cannot be a satisfying reasoning for either result. 
69. One of the goals of the Convention is to promote the enforcement of arbitration agreements.286 
Obviously, an antisuit injunction enjoining a foreign litigation commenced in disrespect of an arbitration 
agreement is a powerful means to that effect. Looking at the issue from another angle, raises, however, 
the some doubts whether this is actually the case: The reason why arbitration agreements must be 
 
283 comp. para. 63 hereinabove in fine.
284 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 
285 Putting the stress on the absence of an express provision precluding American courts from issuing 
antisuit injunctions, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concludes that the Convention does not affect 
the authority of American courts to enjoin foreign proceedings (cf. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. 
Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357, 365). 
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enforced is to facilitate international business transactions and to promote stability in international 
trading.287 These goals resemble those of comity, which is, in turn, endangered by antisuit injunctions. 
So, it might be argued that this means to enforce arbitration agreements is contrary to the very idea of 
why arbitration agreements should be enforced. At least, this sheds certain doubts on the significance 
of the argument that antisuit injunctions protect arbitration agreements and thus implement one of the 
goals of the Convention. There are also other reasons that suggest that the system created by the 
Convention entails that antisuit injunctions should only be granted with reticence. 
70. A feature of the Convention is the way it allocates the responsibility for the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements: The courts of each signatory are obligated to do this. They shall refer the 
parties to arbitration unless there are specific reasons why an arbitration agreement should not be 
enforced.288 The flipside of this assignment is the authority to perform it. The Convention does not 
entrust one particular signatory with determining whether a dispute must be brought to arbitration on 
behalf of all signatories. In other words, the Convention does not overcome the traditional limitation of 
the power of a sovereign to its territory. This pattern can also be detected in other provisions: (i) It is not 
the judicial system of one particular sovereign that decides whether an arbitral award shall be enforced; 
but the courts of "[e]ach Contracting State".289 The decision of the court of one signatory is not binding 
on another signatory. (ii) Even the decision of the courts of origin to set the award aside is not binding 
on the other signatories; they may refuse to enforce such an award, but they do not have to.290 So, the 
Convention allocates responsibility in the form of compartmentation to the courts of the different 
signatories.291 
71. Another structural feature of the Convention is allowing enforcement proceedings in the courts 
 
286 cf. Art. II(3) of the Convention. 
287 cf. Smith/Enron Cogeneration Limited Partnership, Inc., v. Smith Cogeneration International, Inc., 198 
F.3d 88, 92; David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 248 and 250; comp. 
Quigley, p. 1076. 
288 cf. Art. II(1) and (III) of the Convention. 
289 cf. Art. III in connection with Art. V of the Convention. 
290 cf. Art. V(1)(e) of the Convention. 
291 comp. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357, 373. 
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of different sovereigns and, thus, concurrent pre- and post-arbitration enforcement proceedings292 as 
well as concurrent set aside and enforcement proceedings.293 The fact that the Convention allows 
concurrent pre-arbitration proceedings294 and the fact that the Convention confers to- each signatory 
the responsibility to handle these proceedings in accord with the Convention suggests that a multiplicity 
of pre-arbitration enforcement proceedings is, at least not "without more", a reason to issue an antisuit 
injunction.295 Indeed, every signatory must be assumed to have been aware and to have acknowledged 
this system created by the Convention when acceding to the Convention. 
 
cc) Impact of the Contractual Nature of Arbitration Agreements 
 
72. Pacta sunt servanda. So, one argument why an antisuit injunction should be permissible in 
support of an arbitration is that enjoining a foreign litigation is appropriate if the parties had previously 
agreed on a different forum, because an arbitration agreement must be presumed to be of considerable 
importance to the parties.296 This argument is however insofar treacherous as it takes the validity of the 
arbitration agreement as starting point,297 although such a presumption does not follow from the 
wording or the aims of the Convention:298 An arbitration agreement cannot be presumed to satisfy the 
requirements of the Convention. It is only valid if the conditions set forth in the Convention are satisfied, 
i.e. (i) if the "subject matter [is] capable of settlement by arbitration", (ii) if the arbitration agreement is 
not "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed", and (iii) if there is an "agreement in 
writing".299 
292 That is proceedings to enforce the arbitration agreement (pre-arbitration) or the arbitral award (post 
arbitration). 
293 cf. Art. VI of the Convention. 
294 In the posture that is analyzed here, there is a pre-award enforcement proceeding in the domestic court 
where the applicant requests that the parties be referred to arbitration, and in the foreign forum because 
the applicant may be expected to invoke the arbitration agreement in that forum as well. 
295 cf. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357, 368-369. 
296 comp. Wilson, p. 221. 
297 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit e.g. points out that "[s]ignatory nations have effectively declared 
a joint policy that presumes the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate" (cf. Rhone Mediterranée 
Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni e Riassicurazoni v. Achille Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 54). 
298 cf. Weigand, N 111 to Art. II (Part 3). 
299 cf. Art. II of the Convention. 
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73. Obviously, a court will only enjoin a foreign litigation in support of an international arbitration if it 
is convinced that these conditions are satisfied. The question is, however, if the Convention prohibits 
the domestic court from doing so even in such a case, i.e. when the domestic court is of the opinion 
that the dispute must be arbitrated. In answering this question it must in particular be taken into account 
that the foreign forum is equally competent and responsible to decide this issue in accord with the 
Convention. .It is therefore submitted that if both courts may, by applying the Convention, achieve 
different results, no antisuit injunction should be issued. In other words, if the Convention does not 
exclude that there may be different answers as to whether a dispute must be arbitrated, the domestic 
forum cannot take the simple fact that the foreign forum achieves a different result as a reason to enjoin 
the foreign proceeding. This would be at odds with the fact that the Convention does not exclude the 
possibility of concurrent pre-award enforcement proceedings, of which pattern every signatory may be 
assumed to be aware. It must therefore be assessed for each of the three conditions mentioned 
hereinabove whether the foreign and the domestic forum should receive the same answer to the 
question whether they are satisfied, and, if so, whether this warrants an antisuit injunction. 
74. Art. II(1) of the Convention does not explicitly determine which law applies to the issue of non-
arbitrability.300 From the proposals to this respect, the analogous application of Art. V(2)(a) is most 
convincing. Art. V(2)(a) of the Convention specifically addresses non-arbitrability and its analogous 
application secures that the same court does not reach different results regarding non-arbitrability 
depending on the point in time of its analysis, enforcement of the arbitration agreement or of the 
award.301 To the first condition the law of the forum, i.e. where a party invokes that this conditions is not 
satisfied, is therefore applicable.302 The courts of different jurisdictions may therefore bona fide reach 
 
300 cf. van den Berg, p. 152. The fact that Art. II(1) refers to "[e]ach Contracting State" without containing a 
choice of law rule tends to suggest, however, that the law of the forum shall apply. 
301 This might be the case under the alternative proposal to apply Art. V(1)(a) per analogiam if enforcement 
of the arbitration agreement is not sought in the courts of the seat of the arbitration (comp. Weigand, N 
57-58 to Art. II (Part 3)). 
302 cf. van den Berg, p. 153; Weigand, N 58 to Art. II (Part 3). 
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different answers to the question whether the dispute can be submitted to arbitration.303, 304 Based on 
the reasoning in para. 72 hereinabove, it is therefore submitted, that the fact that the foreign court 
considers a dispute to be non-arbitrable under its law cannot justify to enjoin a foreign proceeding. It is 
not possible for one signatory to claim that its solution for non-arbitrability is superior to that of another 
signatory. 
75. The Convention is also silent regarding which law is applicable to the Art. II(3) threshold,305 and 
jurisprudence and doctrine are divided: (i) Some submit that the conflict of law rules of the lex fori are 
pertaining.306 (ii) According to another opinion, an arbitration agreement is invalid if it is subject to an 
internationally recognized defence or when it contravenes a fundamental policy of the forum.307 (iii) 
Others submit that Art. V(1)(a) should be applied by analogy.308 Since it is preferable that the validity of 
the arbitration agreement is determined consistently in the pre- and the post-arbitration stage, the third 
opinion is most convincing. So, to the second condition the law of the seat309 of the arbitration is 
applicable unless the parties chose a particular law; all courts should therefore apply the same law to 
 
303 comp. van Houtte, p. 86-87. It is not yet decided by the European Court of Justice whether the existence 
of an arbitration agreement can be invoked against the enforcement of a judgment that was made in a 
signatory of the Lugano Convention in disregard of an arbitration agreement when the judgment is to be 
enforced in another signatory; if not, there is a conflict between the New York and the Lugano Convention 
(comp. van Houtte, p. 87-89). 
304 Moreover, different results may be the consequence of a different extent of judicial control regarding 
arbitrability in the pre-arbitration context. 
305 cf. Weigand, N 60 to Art. II (Part 3). 
306 cf. Born, p. 314. 
307 cf. Rhone Mediterranée Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni e Riassicurazoni v. Achille Lauro, 712 F.2d 
50, 53; Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187. 
308 cf. van den Berg, p. 126-127; Weigand, N 60 to Art. II (Part 3). 
309 This approach poses problems if the parties have not agreed on the seat of the arbitration (interestingly, 
the civil-law doctrine considers these cases to be rare (comp. Weigand, N 61 to Art. II (Part 3), while the 
common-law doctrine submits that there are many such cases (comp. Born, p. 314)). In particular 
because an arbitration agreement that does not fix the seat may pose numerous problems, it seems 
appropriate to require a showing by the applicant that the arbitration agreement is enforceable in such a 
case. Enjoining the foreign litigation without the prospect of an arbitration seems inadequate, i.e. an 
antisuit injunction should only be issued if there is at least potentially a concurrent arbitration. If the 
antisuit injunction is sought in an American court in such a case, it may e.g. be expected that the applicant 
also moves to compel arbitration in the district where the motion is filed (comp. Art. 4 FAA, Jain v. de 
Mere, 51 F.3d 686), thus determining the seat of the arbitration. 
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examine whether this condition is satisfied.310 The question is thus whether it is admissible for the 
domestic court to enjoin the foreign proceeding if it thinks that the foreign court will misapply or has 
already misapplied the law of the seat of the arbitration. At the end of the day, a court, which has to 
take this decision before the foreign court has ruled on a defence of arbitrability has the following 
choice: It can choose to trust that the foreign court will correctly apply the Convention. This approach 
promotes comity between the courts of several sovereign, but bears the risk that the foreign court will 
not respect its obligations under the Convention. Or, the domestic court can make sure that the 
Convention will not be violated by issuing an antisuit injunction. This interferes with the sovereignty of 
the foreign court and thus endangers the goals comity tries to achieve. Both approaches have their 
flaws and a court should therefore try to handle such cases with care. Foremost by demanding from the 
applicant that he invoke the arbitration agreement in the foreign proceeding and by enjoining the foreign 
proceeding only if the foreign court then disrespects the arbitration agreement.311 This way, the issue is 
reduced to cases where the court unavoidably has to take a stand with respect to a motion to issue an 
antisuit injunction. Now, if the court must decide, because the foreign court refused to send the parties 
to arbitration, it should refrain from enjoining the foreign proceeding if the seat of the arbitration is within 
the territory of the foreign forum, whose proceedings are requested to be enjoined. Not only because 
the foreign forum must be presumed to know best how to apply its own law, but also because the 
parties deliberately chose this seat and thus accepted the risks connected therewith. If the seat of the 
arbitration is in a third signatory, an American court may take into account that the Convention does not 
create a relationship between the signatories that is as close as that between the signatories to the 
Lugano-Convention: Decisions of one signatory relating to the subject-matter of the Convention, need 
not, like decisions relating to jurisdiction under the Lugano Convention, be enforced quasi 
 
310 The same may theoretically be supposed under the approach that validity must be verified based on 
internationally recognized defenses (comp. fn. 307 hereinabove). 
311 Comp. Lenenbach, p. 289, submitting that arbitration agreements are self-executory in the signatories of 
the Convention so that injunctive relief to enforce arbitration agreements is only needed if a party 
commences a lawsuit in a non-signatory that does not respect the arbitration agreement based on its 
internal law and Stone, p. 145, submitting that the Convention entrusts the duty of respecting an 
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automatically, and the Convention does not allocate jurisdiction between the signatories like the Lugano 
Convention. Therefore, it seems justifiable for an American court to enjoin a foreign litigation that 
interferes with an arbitration agreement if (i) it deems, in contrast to the foreign court, that the 
arbitrators have jurisdiction over their dispute under Art. V(1)(a) of the Convention,312and (ii) if the 
specific requirements for an antisuit injunction313 as well as for ordering specific performance of a 
contract314 are satisfied.315 Because the efficacy of the Convention depends on the good faith of the 
signatories and because such good-faith attitude might be affected by antisuit injunctions,316 the foreign 
proceeding should however only be enjoined if it is established that the foreign forum undoubtedly 
misapplied the pertinent law. 
76. The same as for questions regarding the substantive validity of arbitration agreements also 
applies to questions regarding their formal validity, as the Convention provides in Art II(2) for uniform 
standards, so that the same solution should be obtained irrespective of where this issue arises.  
77. The system of the Convention thus precludes the domestic court from enjoining a foreign 
proceeding solely because a contract is invoked as basis for the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, and 
thus indirectly as basis for the antisuit injunction: This argument pro antisuit inunctions, the existence of 
a jurisdiction-related agreement, is only available if there is only one correct solution and if the foreign 
court obviously got it wrong when examining the formal and/or substantive validity of the arbitration 
agreement. So, if the Convention is applicable, the (alleged) existence of an arbitration agreement 
 
arbitration agreement to the court seized in breach of the arbitration agreement and that an antisuit 
injunction should, for that reason, not be issued in such a posture at all. 
312 cf. In re Laitsalo, 196 B.R. 913, 924. 
313 Most courts facing this issue do not address the basic requirements for an injunction (an exception is 
Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. Robhal, Inc., 961 F.Supp. 822; comp. in re Laitsalo, 196 B.R. 913, 920; 
Smoothline, Ltd. v. North American Foreign Trading Corp., 2002 WL 273301 1,6).  
314 comp para. 16 hereinabove. 
315 Arbitration agreements are enforceable like other contracts (cf. Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Stanford 
University, 489 U.S. 468, 478; Sphere Drake Insurance, Ltd. v. All American Life Insurance, 307 F.3d 617, 
620) and judgments compelling arbitration, which are protected by an antisuit injunction, order specific 
performance of such an agreement (cf. Necchi s.p.a. v. Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp., 348 F.2d 
693, 696; Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 986; Joseph Muller Corp. 
v. Commonwealth Petrochemicals, Inc., 334 F.Supp 1013, 1018). 
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supports granting antisuit injunctions only to a limited degree. Therefore, the opinion, that the clearest 
case for the grant of an antisuit injunction is where it enforces an existing contractual obligation, like an 
arbitration agreement,317 is not convincing. 
78. Prima facie, it may seem troublesome that the contractual nature of arbitration agreements is 
not given more weight. However, American courts should refrain from a provincial attitude regarding the 
fairness of other tribunals,318 and the Convention allows the party that wants to oppose to the 
enforcement of an arbitration award to invoke that the arbitral agreement is invalid,319 that the writing 
requirement is not met,320 and that the dispute is non-arbitrable.321 The same should also be possible in 
the pre-arbitration stage, in particular because these conditions are also listed in Art. II of the 
Convention. Prohibiting a party from invoking that an arbitration agreement is not enforceable therefore 
seems to be at odds with the Convention. 
79. Moreover, a party that has certain contacts with the foreign forum must expect that the foreign 
forum will in such a case confirm its jurisdiction. This will not harm this party as long as it does not have 
assets in this forum that make the judgment enforceable there. If it has, the party should even more 
have verified the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. Even in such a case, this party may still be 
awarded its claims in the domestic forum and be able to enforce it there; and it is not to be expected 
that an award that was actually rendered in violation of an arbitration agreement is enforceable in the 
domestic or a third forum.322 
e) Conclusion 
 
316 comp. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357, 373; 
Quigley, p. 1070. 
317 cf. Whincop/Keyes, p. 152; comp. Briggs/Rees, N 5.39 (p. 373). 
318 cf. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore, Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-13 and 15; comp Lenenbach, p. 285. 
319 cf. Art. V(1)(a) of the Convention. 
320 cf. van den Berg, p. 285. 
321 cf. Art. V(2)(a) of the Convention. 
322 comp. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357, 369, 
pointing out that it is not the burden of the American courts to protect a party from all legal hardship it 
might encounter in an international dispute. 
54 
80. The cases which are analyzed under this heading must be distinguished from Karaha Bodas323 
because both the foreign and the domestic forum have the same function, they deal with the 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement.324 An antisuit injunction can therefore not be denied outright, 
but the arguments that are to a certain degree contra antisuit injunctions, that of the system created by 
the Convention, and pro antisuit injunctions, the contractual nature of arbitration agreements, must be 
weighed. It is submitted that the crux for this balancing is Art. II(3) of the Convention, which provides 
that the parties shall be referred to arbitration if certain conditions are satisfied. It transpires that the 
Convention intends to protect a party from litigation exposure before a court when there is an arbitration 
agreement.325 On the other hand, a party shall not be forced into an arbitration if it did not sign a valid 
arbitration agreement. Given these contradicting principles and the above analysis, it is submitted here 
that a foreign litigation should only be enjoined in support of an arbitration if the foreign court obviously 
misapplied the applicable provisions on substantive and/or formal validity of the arbitration agreement 
and therefore, wrongly, did not refer the parties to arbitration.326 
81. What pushes the applicant over the comity threshold is the necessity to protect the integrity of 
the Convention, which mandates the signatories to refer the parties to arbitration if there is an 
arbitration agreement.327 The Convention does, on the other hand, oust domestic law as a source for 
equitable factors that may outweigh comity under the restrictive approach: (i) The system of equal 
responsibility of all signatories to implement the Convention precludes antisuit injunctions to protect the 
jurisdiction of the domestic court. Only if the foreign forum itself violates the system created by the 
Convention by carving out exclusive jurisdiction, a counter-antisuit injunction is compatible with the 
Convention. (ii) The public policy that warrants antisuit injunctions is the enforcement of arbitration 
 
323 cf. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357. 
324 comp. para. 58 hereinabove. 
325 cf. Weigand, N. 102 to Art. II ( Part 3). 
326 cf. paras. 74-75 hereinabove. 
327 In a domestic case, a federal court enjoined a state court action based on the re-litigation exception in the 
Antisuit Injunction Act, when a party intended to re-litigate its counterclaim, which had been dismissed in a 
previous arbitration, in state court (cf. Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Stuart, 11 F.Supp.2d 221, 225). The 
court held that the confirmation of the arbitral award, the award of the arbitrators and the public policy in 
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agreements, which is directly deductible from the Convention. 
82. Again, the regular criteria for injunctions must be taken into account: 
(i) Both domestic and foreign remedies at law must be taken into account to examine 
whether there are no adequate remedies at law. Inadequacy of a foreign remedy at law 
must be assumed from a domestic perspective when the foreign court does not handle 
an objection to its jurisdiction based on the arbitration agreement as it should pursuant to 
the Convention.328 As to the domestic remedies, it is submitted that monetary damages 
are inadequate if an arbitration agreement is violated.329 
(ii) Likelihood of success on the merits is established when there is a reasonable probability 
that resorting to a state-run courts violates an arbitration agreement between the 
parties.330 The merits thus relate to the arbitrability of the dispute.331, 332 
(iii) Irreparable harm exists when bringing suit instead of initiating arbitration deprives the other 
party of its contractual right to arbitrate its claims and the thus creates the danger of 
conflicting judgments.333, 334 
favour of arbitration would be undermined if the defendant were allowed to return to the state court and 
therefore enjoined such a proceeding (cf. Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Stuart, 11 F.Supp.2d 221, 225). 
328 comp. para. 75 hereinabove. 
329 cf. Wilson, p. 215. 
330 cf. Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. Robhal, Inc., 961 F.Supp. 822, 829. 
331 cf. American Heritage Life Insurance v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 707; Miller v. Flume, 139 F.3d 1130, 1137; 
Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Central Life Insurance Co., 85 F.3d 21, 30; Painewebber, Inc. v. Willard S. 
Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 514; United Offshore Company v. Southern Deepwater Pipeline Company, 899 
F.2d 405, 408; General Electric v. Deutz AG, 129 F.Supp.2d 776, 787 and 789; Mount Ararat Cementary 
v. Cemetary Workers, 975 F.Supp. 445, 447; Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. National Tea 
Company, 346 F.Supp. 875, 881. 
332 A decision compelling arbitration is appealable pursuant to § 16(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration Act (cf. 
Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 88-89). Such a decision of a court of first 
instance is therefore not final and does not, in general, have res iudicata effect. Therefore, a court of first 
instance cannot rely on such a decision to enjoin a foreign proceeding, i.e. simply by pointing at its own 
earlier decision and stating that an antisuit injunction is necessary to protect that judgment (cf. General 
Electric v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 159). So, arbitrability represents the merits of the case and is, 
therefore, relevant to assess whether there is success on the merits; the decision on arbitrability does, 
however, not push over the comity threshold under the protection-of-jurisdiction approach. 
333 cf. Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems, 2003 WL 23641529 1, 12. 
334 According to Specialty Bakeries v. Robhal, interference with the functioning of the arbitration process 
constitutes irreparable harm (cf. Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. Robhal, Inc., 961 F.Supp. 822, 829). This 
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(iv) The principle that agreements must be abided by tips the balance in favor of the 
applicant if the foreign forum denies and the domestic forum upholds the formal and 
substantive validity of the arbitration agreement. 
 
C. Antisuit Injunctions to the Detriment of Arbitration Proceedings 
 
83. There may be cases where a dispute is pending before an American court and, concurrently, 
before a foreign arbitral tribunal. The question arises whether the claimant in the domestic litigation can 
then request that the foreign arbitration be enjoined. American case law approaches these cases like 
those involving concurrent litigations, i.e. an arbitral tribunal is given the same standing like a foreign 
court.335 Consequently, comity requires to pay respect to international arbitral tribunals as well,336 and 
comity is considered to be outweighed if the domestic court has to protect its jurisdiction or a public 
policy of the forum.337 So an arbitration is for instance enjoined if a motion to compel arbitration is 
dismissed,338 or to protect the res iudicata effect of a prior judgment of the court.339 
perspective puts the stress rather on the institution of arbitration than on the parties seeking equitable 
relief. Since a party must establish that it itself will suffer irreparable harm, however, the reasoning in 
Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems, 2003 WL 23641529 1, 12 is more convincing. 
335 comp. General Electric v. Deutz AG, 129 F.Supp.2d 776; Koob v. IDS Financial Services, Inc., 629 
N.Y.S.2d 426, 432; Motorola Credit Corporation v. Uzan, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19632. 
336 cf. General Electric v. Deutz AG, 129 F.Supp.2d 776, 782. 
337 cf. Motorola Credit Corporation v. Uzan, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19632 1, 10-11. In this case, the court first 
examined whether the domestic litigation was dispositive of the foreign arbitration. It held that the 
defendants before it had complete control over the party on their side in the arbitration and that the 
determination that was sought by the arbitrators (an award upholding the defence of force majeure and a 
corresponding adaptation of the contract between the parties) was the main defence against the fraud 
claims before the court (cf. idem at 11). The court therefore concluded that parties and issues were the 
same and enjoined the arbitration. It is submitted that the correct approach would have been to analyze 
whether the defendant’s alleged fraudulent conduct, specifically related to the arbitration agreement and, 
if not, to have the defendant’s defence, which related to the contract that contained the arbitration 
agreement, decided by the arbitrators (cf. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 
403-404). The decision of the arbitrators would in this case have been dispositive of the court action: Had 
they found force majeure, the actions filed in court would have had to be dismissed. It is therefore 
submitted that the court should not have enjoined the arbitration. Indeed, the court examined whether the 
claimant was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim, and not on its contention that claim should not be 
arbitrated (comp. para. 82(ii) hereinabove). 
338 cf. In re Piper, 71 F.3d 298, 302, Motorola Credit Corporation v. Uzan, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19632 1, 10-
11. 
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84. The cases on point do not discuss whether the Convention has any impact on the decision of 
the court. It is submitted that it has: The starting point of a decision to enjoin an arbitral tribunal is that 
the dispute is not arbitrable and that he parties shall therefore not be referred to arbitration, as follows 
from Art. II(3) of the Convention. So, Art. II(3) is the basis for the position that no one shall be 
compelled to arbitrate when there is no arbitration agreement. However, while an antisuit injunction 
would therefore not conflict with Art. II(3), it is not possible to identify arguments that positively support 
issuing antisuit injunctions in this provision. 
85. Since the domestic forum considers the alleged arbitration agreement to be invalid in this 
posture, the enforcement of a mutually agreed way to settle a dispute is not a reason to enjoin the 
foreign proceeding. The starting point is therefore that this case involves proceedings pending in two 
tribunals and that antisuit injunctions can at most be issued to the extent this is possible in concurrent-
litigation cases. Since the restrictive approach is favored here, an antisuit injunction is therefore only - if 
at all - possible if it is necessary to protect a public policy or the jurisdiction of the domestic forum. 
86. The starting point for the analysis is that arbitral tribunals are thought to fairly, impartially and 
competently decide the case submitted to it, and in particular, to follow the law.340 The fact that the case 
is concurrently pending before a domestic court and a foreign arbitral tribunal must therefore be 
ascribed to the fact that these two tribunals apply different rules as to when a case must be submitted 
to arbitration - the court applying the domestic rules, the arbitral tribunal applying those of the lex arbitri 
- and not to a suspicion that the arbitral tribunal misapplies the law.  
87. To maintain that an antisuit injunction is necessary to protect a public policy of the domestic 
forum, the applicant will generally maintain that the subject matter is non-arbitrable according to the 
standards of the forum. As already shown, different approaches to non-arbitrability are, however, not a 
 
339 According to General Electric v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 159, a judgment of a court of first instance that 
denies a motion to compel arbitration does, however, not have res iudicata effect, so that it is not 
sufficient to enjoin a foreign arbitration to protect a judgment of the domestic court (comp. fn. 332 
hereinabove). 
340 cf. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. MaMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232; Mitsubishi Motors Corp., v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 634. 
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basis to enjoin a foreign proceeding.341 A signatory must therefore respect a decision of the arbitral 
tribunal that the dispute is not non-arbitrable based on the standards of the applicable lex arbitri and 
cannot enjoin the foreign arbitration based thereon. 
88. Regarding the protection of the jurisdiction of the domestic court, it may first be assumed that an 
arbitral tribunal is normally not empowered by the parties to issue antisuit injunctions, so that the 
domestic court will hardly ever need a counter-antisuit injunction to protect its jurisdiction.342 Second, it 
must be examined whether an antisuit injunction may be issued to protect an earlier judgment on the 
merits of the domestic court. This depends on whether this judgment can be plead as res iudicata in the 
arbitration.343 Even if the domestic court answers this question in the negative, it is still another question 
whether it is compatible with the Convention to enjoin the arbitration. Here, it is submitted that it is not: 
If one forum enjoins an arbitration, it prevents an arbitral award and by doing so deprives the courts of 
the other signatories from examining themselves whether the arbitral tribunal had proper jurisdiction - 
be it in an enforcement proceeding or in a set-aside proceeding. The domestic court would transfer to 
itself the authority that the Convention vests in the courts of each signatory, and it forces its view on 
arbitral jurisdiction on the other signatories. The same is true for the relation between the country of 
origin and the domestic forum: According to the Convention the country of origin and the other 
signatories play different roles, and an antisuit injunction against a foreign set-aside proceeding is 
precluded if the role of the American court is limited to the enforcement of the arbitral award.344 An 
analogous application of the reasoning in Karaha Bodas,345 would therefore suggest that an 
interference with the country of origin is inappropriate, also when the interference takes place before 
the award is issued. For such a pre-award interference would preclude the country of origin from 
verifying whether the arbitral award satisfies the standards of the lex arbitri, which it is authorized to do 
 
341 cf. para. 74 hereinabove. 
342 Comp. however General Electric Company v. Deutz AG, 129 F.Supp.2d 776 where the arbitral tribunal 
tried to carve out exclusive jurisdiction sua sponte.
343 To assess this, the domestic court must take the perspective of the arbitral tribunal (comp. para. 40 
hereinabove), i.e. apply the lex arbitri since it results from Art. V(1)(e) of the Convention that the arbitral 
tribunal is monitored pursuant to these rules. 
344 comp. para. 58 hereinabove. 
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pursuant to Art. V(1)(e) of the Convention. According to this provision, it is the country of origin that is to 
monitor the arbitration. A potential enforcement court on the other hand is limited to issues relating to 
the enforcement of the award.346 
89. So, while an arbitration agreement can be enforced by an antisuit injunction in some instances 
when the seat of the arbitration is not in the territory of the foreign forum, a finding that the parties did 
not agree to arbitrate cannot be enforced by an antisuit injunction, when the seat of the arbitration is in 
a foreign forum. 
 
D. Antisuit Injunctions Preventing the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards abroad 
 
a) Requested from a Court of the Country of Origin 
 
90. A court of the country of origin of the award may face a request to enjoin the enforcement of an 
arbitration award in a foreign forum, e.g. based on the allegation that the award cannot be deemed 
binding since certain formalities are (not yet) complied with or based on the fact that a request to set 
the award aside was filed.347 In such a case, the court will have to decide whether the Convention 
applies such a request. If it does, the goal of the Convention to facilitate the enforcement of arbitration 
awards348 and Art. V(1)(e) suggest that an antisuit injunction should not be permissible. The latter 
provision vests in the courts of the signatory where enforcement is sought the discretion349 to enforce or 
disregard an award that was set-aside or is not yet binding in the country of origin. An antisuit injunction 
in such a posture would therefore be at odds with Art. V(1)(e). Moreover, it may again be referred to 
 
345 cf. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357, 372-373. 
346 cf. idem.
347 An example for such a case is Oil Natural Gas Commission v. Western Co. of North America, decided by 
the Indian Supreme Court (74 All India Rep. S.C. 674 (1987), printed in Tibor Varady/John J. BarcelV,
III/Arthur T. van Mehren, International Commercial Arbitration, St. Paul 1999, p. 637 et seq.). Since the 
parties had agreed that the Indian Arbitration Act should apply, the Indian Supreme Court considered the 
arbitration to be a domestic arbitration, with the consequence that the award must, pursuant to Indian law, 
be confirmed by an Indian court before it becomes binding. As the enforcement proceeding was initiated 
before the award was confirmed, enforcement of the award was deemed to be oppressive and, therefore, 
enjoined. 
348 cf. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357, 366-367. 
349 cf. Art. V(1): "Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused …" (emphasis added). 
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Karaha Bodas350 where the court reasoned that an enforcement court should not interfere with a set-
aside proceeding because different tasks are assigned to the courts of the country of origin and the 
enforcement courts. Under this heading, it is just the other way round: The antisuit injunction is sought 
from the set-aside court. However, the reasoning in Karaha Bodas is general enough to be applicable 
vice versa.351 It is therefore decisive whether the Convention has an impact on the issue at stake.352 
91. The Convention does not affect the law of the country of origin for set-aside and domestic 
enforcement proceedings. But, the crux is that the Convention applies to the enforcement of arbitral 
awards in signatories other than that where the award was made.353 It is therefore submitted that a 
signatory must respect that enforcement in another signatory will take place according to the 
Convention, in particular because this very issue is addressed in the Convention itself.354 For this 
reason, the Convention applies and an antisuit injunction of the country of origin against the 
enforcement of the award in a foreign forum should not be issued: Whether the domestic law of the 
country of origin is taken into account is in the discretion of the enforcement forum.355 
b) Requested from another Enforcement Courts 
 
92. Another question needs to be addressed briefly. It will not arise often: Can an enforcement court 
enjoin an enforcement proceeding in another signatory? It is submitted here that this question should 
be answered in the negative. That enforcement proceedings may be concurrently pending in different 
courts follows from a reading of the Convention. This again suggests that the countries that acceded to 
the Convention were aware of this system and must therefore be thought to have agreed to it. 
Moreover, issuing an antisuit injunction would conflict with the goal of the Convention to facilitate the 
 
350 cf. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357. 
351 cf. idem, p 372-373. 
352 The dispute whether the term "non binding" shall be subject to an autonomous interpretation or an 
interpretation pursuant to the law of the country of origin is not decisive (comp. Weigand, N 77 to Art. V 
(Part 3)): Under both approaches, the courts where enforcement is sought have the discretion to enforce 
the award. The question is therefore, whether the Convention applies at all. 
353 cf. Art. I of the Convention. According to this provision, it also applies for the enforcement of the award in 
the country of origin if the award is not considered as domestic there; this situation is, however, for the 
present analysis not of interest. 
354 cf. Art. V(1)(e) of the Convention. 
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enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.356 
355 cf. Art. V(1)(e) of the Convention. 
356 cf. Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak, 335 F.3d 357, 366-367. 
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E. Summary 
 
93. As exemplified by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Karaha Bodas,357 it is appropriate 
to take the Convention into account when dealing with antisuit injunctions in the context of international 
commercial arbitrations. While the Convention does not expressly limit the availability of antisuit 
injunctions, its structure, in particular the allocation of different roles to different sovereigns, evidences 
that such injunctions are only in rare instances compatible with the structure and the spirit of the 
Convention. 
94. When it comes to enjoining a foreign litigation in support of an arbitration, the courts should (i) 
not presume the validity of the arbitration agreement, but assess this, together with the other aspects of 
arbitrability as a preliminary issue, (ii) and respect that a foreign forum may obtain a different result to 
the same issue if the Convention does not fix a certain end or the means to get there. In particular, a 
better-law approach is mistaken. So, an antisuit injunction should only be issued in such a case if it 
follows objectively from the Convention that the foreign court obviously took a wrong decision. In the 
other cases where an antisuit injunction may be requested in the context of international arbitration, it is 
not compatible with the allocation of tasks and responsibilities provided for by the Convention to grant 
such a request.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
95. Antisuit injunctions are a powerful tool to enforce a decision on jurisdiction. But it goes without 
saying that the exercise of power by the domestic forum leads to frustration on the side of the foreign 
forum because of the interference with its jurisdiction.358 The present paper therefore submits that 
antisuit injunctions should not too readily be available, as under the liberal approach. It is also 
submitted that the test for antisuit injunctions should include the regular conditions for granting 
injunctive relief. This expresses that antisuit injunctions are a subspecies of injunctive relief and will in 
some cases limit the availability of the tool. Also, the alleged presence of a jurisdiction-related 
 
357 comp. fn. 254 hereinabove. 
358 comp. James v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company, 14 Ill.2d 356, 371-372. 
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agreement should not have the effect that foreign proceedings are enjoined outright; foreign courts may 
by applying their laws come to another conclusion than the domestic court regarding the validity of such 
an agreement.  
96. Moreover, conventions on international civil procedure should be taken into account when 
deciding whether an antisuit injunction should be issued. In general, they will limit the availability of the 
antisuit injunction tool, because what a convention expresses, mutual trust, is at odds with what an 
antisuit injunction expresses, mistrust in the judicial system of other sovereigns. 
97. The above reveals a certain skepticism against the antisuit injunction tool, which is based on 
comity-concerns and the fact that a concept that creates a deadlock359 when it is applied by all 
jurisdictions that are involved raises doubts as to its appropriateness. Moreover it may be asked 
whether a tool that was developed to secure the working of the judicial system within one sovereign, 
where concerns of efficiency have considerable weight, is an appropriate tool in the inter-sovereign 
context,360 even if its availability is limited based on comity concerns like under the restrictive approach. 
Of course the presence of multiple suits is not desirable. But it may be questioned whether antisuit 
injunctions are the adequate tool to prevent this on an international level, and, in particular, whether it 
should be up to one sovereign to de facto decide on the jurisdiction of another sovereign. Another 
approach for the domestic forum is (i) to accept that a foreign forum which with the parties have 
contacts assumes jurisdiction to adjudicate and/or enforce, a risk the parties must be assumed to have 
accepted, and (ii) to limit itself to avoiding that contradicting judgments are present within the domestic 
forum, which could for instance be achieved by strengthening the principle of lis pendens.361 
359 cf. para. 6 hereinabove. 
360 comp. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 927 (fn. 49). 
361 cf. Lowenfeld, p. 318. 
